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Markets in which secondhand goods are traded perform a variety of
important economic functions.' For example, the markets for financial assets
provide liquidity for traders, allowing corporations to maintain viable sources
of investment capital.' Because houses are very durable while individuals'
tastes and preferences for location and style change, local real estate markets
allow for spatial reallocation of households.3 Antique markets provide avenues
for investors and collectors to share risks and allocate the consumption of
"master" works.4 Flea markets, garage sales, and swap meets give individuals
the opportunity to sell items in excess supply to people with an excess demand
for the same.5 In all of these cases, efficiency is enhanced by transferring
ownership of assets from lower valued uses to higher valued ones.
The market for used cars is an important secondhand market. As noted
below, it is a market that has grown in size from year to year and where
growth will most likely continue. Large numbers of buyers and sellers enter
into transactions in any given year, moving cars from lower to higher value
uses. Since new cars are expensive, low income households would often be
unable to purchase automobiles without a viable used car market. The market
also allows individuals to accommodate changes in tastes and preferences for
style, user circumstances, and financial conditions easily, quickly, and at low
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1. Although concerned primarily with the macroeconomic implications of the secondhand markets
for financial assets, a recent discussion of the importance of these markets can be found in Tibor
Scitovsky, Towards a Theory of Second-hand Markets, 47 KYKLOS 33 (1994).
2. See id. For a more general treatment of both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects, see
GEORGE C. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: MONEY, MARKETS, AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
3. Residential relocation in the housing market occurs through a process called filtering. See
RICHARD F. MUTrH & ALLEN C. GOODMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING MARKETS 41-42 (1989) for
a theoretical discussion. For an empirical study of residential movement and the filtering process, see
MARTIN CADWALLER, MIGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY (1992).
4. See JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE (1993)
(discussing markets and institutions for fine art).
5. The welfare enhancing effects of trading for endowments can be found in most intermediate
microeconomics texts. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & AMIHAI GLAZER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS (5th ed. 1992).
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cost. In addition, the used car market reduces the need for resources to be
devoted to the production and distribution of new cars, providing a higher level
of economic well-being as those resources can be devoted to other uses.
6
Individuals trading in many secondhand markets, however, sometimes face
a problem that can inhibit market efficiency. Informational asymmetry arises
when one party to a bargain, usually the seller, has more and better informa-
tion about the condition of a product than does the buyer. In the presence of
informational asymmetry, inefficient transactions may be consummated or the
market may completely fail. In the market for automobiles, this type of
informational problem has been identified as the "lemons" problem.7
A second type of informational problem in markets occurs when consumers
fail to understand the nature of the products they buy.' Buyers may not be
informed or knowledgeable about all the components and linkages of a complex
6. The market for used cars is not only important in its own right, as noted by Scitovsky, supra
note 1, but also in relation to the new car market, since these goods are good substitutes. The
relationship between the new and used car markets is explored in James Berkovec, New Car Sales and
Used Car Stocks: A Model of the Automobile Market, 16 RAND J. ECON. 195 (Summer 1985). One
could argue that economic dislocation may occur if consumer preferences shift significantly toward used
cars and away from new cars; however such dislocation will not occur. Rising consumer incomes and
population will provide "room" for both used car and new car markets to expand. Moreover, any
dislocation, if it were to occur, would be minor and exist for a short time only. The purchase of used
cars presupposes that new cars were produced in the past, implying a healthy new car market. The used
car market has always been larger than the new car market in terms of units sold. See AAMA, infra
note 14, for historical data on the size of the used and new car markets. Also, the discussions in
Eisenstein, infra note 16, and Cavanaugh, infra note 18, discuss the relative size of the used car market.
So, the large size of the used car market is nothing new. Even if a substantial reduction in new car
demand reflected new consumer preferences, and resources were diverted from the new car market, the
dislocation would be only temporary. The relative prices of new and used cars would change, mitigating
some of the changed preference effect. The net reduction in units of new cars produced would release
resources, labor, and capital, to produce other goods and services. This type of resource mobility takes
place in a dynamic economy all of the time with only minor, short-term adverse impacts. Any general
economic history of the United States considers episodes of rapid and dynamic change to the economy.
For an example, see GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY,
chs. 9, 10 (7th ed. 1994) (responding to changes in eighteenth century such as Civil War and
introduction of railroad). See also SIDNEY RATNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, pt. III (2d ed. 1993) (dealing with industrialization of manufacturing). Indeed, without this
resource mobility society would suffer in that consumers would not be able to obtain goods and services
which they value and want.
7. The lemons problem refers to a situation in which sellers have an incentive to bring below
average quality items to market for sale. As buyers discover through experience that sellers are bringing
below average products to the market, the price they are willing to pay declines to reflect the lower
quality. The fall in price then signals sellers to bring even lower quality items to the market. This
"spiraling" of lower prices and quality can eventually lead to complete market collapse, with no sales
occurring. The economic analysis of the lemons problem was first detailed in George A. Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970 Q.J. ECON. 488. For a
more general discussion of uncertainty and market behavior, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY,
THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1992).
8. The failure of consumers to understand the nature of a product is most likely not an absolute or
complete lack of understanding. That is, the mere desire to purchase (or even shop for) a product
implies that a consumer will have some understanding about a product, its attributes, and functions.
However, a consumer will probably not have complete information or all of the accurate information
about a product.
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product such as an automobile. Therefore, consumers might incorrectly
estimate the probability of product failure and the costs associated with such
a failure. The high cost of investigating for latent defects (and even some
"patent" ones) may result in a non-optimal allocation of resources for product
inspection, leading to excessive expenditures on repairs. These problems arise
from uncertainty: Consumers may not accurately predict what will happen in
the future as they use products.9
The purchase of used cars clearly is subject to consumer uncertainty. The
product itself is complex, with many highly integrated systems that are not
completely familiar to most buyers. Although inspection for patent problems
may be relatively inexpensive, testing for latent defects can be difficult and
expensive. Even knowledge of prior ownership history does not provide
complete, perfect information about a vehicle's condition. Not surprisingly,
then, some observers and analysts' believe that used cars are traded with
excessive defects and problems due to incomplete information and product
uncertainty. In addition, they argue, because of incomplete or inaccurate
information, consumers will not demand proper warranty protection. Thus,
warranty terms generated in the market will be inefficient.
This Article evaluates relatively recent legislative attempts to deal with the
perceived problems of poor quality in the used car market, namely mandatory
used car warranty laws. The primary concern of the analysis is twofold. First,
the used car market is growing in terms of importance for consumers and the
economy. To the extent that consumers are not able to evaluate correctly and
therefore overestimate the quality of used cars, they will purchase an inefficient
number of used automobiles with inappropriate warranty terms. Resources will
be misallocated; too many used cars will be purchased. If used car buyers
receive inappropriate warranty coverage, they will incur excessive private
repair and replacement costs. In addition, sellers may sell excessively defective
used vehicles." As used car purchases become a larger part of the automobile
9. The questions of whether consumers misperceive information about used car quality and whether
the market generates the correct price based on consumer information have been the subject of much
empirical research. See James L. Ginter et al., A Market Efficiency Study of Used Car Reliability and
Prices, 21 J. CONSUMER AFF. 258 (1987); Michael D. Pratt & George E. Hoffer, The Efficacy of State
Mandated Minimum Quality Certification: The Case of Used Vehicles, 24 EcON. INQUIRY 313 (Apr.
1986) [hereinafter Pratt & Hoffer, The Case of Used Vehicles]; Michael D. Pratt & George E. Hoffer,
State Used Motor Vehicle Disclosure Laws: Do They Make a Difference to the Consumer?, 19 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 177 (1985) [hereinafter Pratt & Hoffer, State Used Motor Vehicle Disclosure Laws].
10. For a discussion of the need to impose mandatory rules to help consumers, see Lee D.
Dahringer & Denise R. Johnson, Lemon Laws: Intent, Experience, and a Pro-Consumer Model, 22 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 158 (1988). For an argument that the market terms for used cars are not correct, see
Ginter et al., supra note 9.
11. Defects will exist even in vehicles sold with warranties, since there are some defects which a
seller cannot discover or cure through the exercise of reasonable care. See Used Car Defects Being Fixed
But Report Finds Buyers Don't Know Rights Under Lemon Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1990, at 76
(reporting survey finding 33 % of purchasers who bought used cars with express warranty encountered
safety and other defects). For such defects, a warranty provides insurance to a buyer. If a vehicle is sold
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market, the potential for these misallocations and costs increases in signifi-
cance. Second, if the belief about the inefficiency of the used car market is
incorrect, attempts (such as the imposition of mandatory warranty legislation)
to solve a problem which does not exist may well lead to unintended adverse
consequences. 2
This Article focuses on the role of warranty legislation as a remedy for the
problems of asymmetric information and consumer choice under uncertainty in
the used car market. The principle question addressed in this Article is whether
mandatory warranties in the sale of used cars are an appropriate way to deal
with buyer informational problems.13 The issue to be considered is the extent
to which asymmetric information and resulting buyer purchasing behavior
present problems in the used car market. This is more complex than just asking
what each used car buyer knows about a product. In a market, any individual
buyer's knowledge about a product is irrelevant as long as some buyers (and
sellers) possess accurate information and bring it to the market. Rather, the
issue goes to the heart of how prices and other contract terms, such as
warranties, are formulated in markets. If, indeed, the market provides
appropriate terms, the imposition of mandatory warranties will result in sub-
optimal terms and may generate adverse unintended consequences. These
consequences will manifest themselves both in terms of efficiency problems and
equity effects.
This Article will demonstrate that the used car market provides efficient
warranty terms without mandatory warranty legislation, and that the negative
unintended consequences of such legislation are likely to outweigh any intended
benefits. First, the Article presents some basic information about the market
for used cars in the United States. The way in which warranty law operates in
the absence of mandatory legislation is described in Part II. Part III analyzes
warranties currently offered in the sale of used cars and presents the arguments
offered as to why, under existing warranty law without mandatory warranty
legislation, there is market failure attributable to consumer ignorance. Part IV
describes the contents of warranty legislation designed to deal with this
perceived market failure. Responding to the market failure arguments, Part V
analyzes the structure of the used car market and how that market operates to
generate appropriate and efficient warranty terms. Part VI examines some
existing warranties to determine whether their terms are consistent with
efficiency. Finally, since the market does provide appropriate and efficient
without a warranty, a buyer bears the risks of all defects, including those that the seller could have
detected and cured through the exercise of reasonable care.
12. To evaluate the likelihood of unintended consequences from the imposition of mandatory
warranties, it is necessary to understand how the market for used cars works and how behavioral
incentives will change with the imposition of such obligations.
13. For a related analysis, see Michael R. Metzger, Cherries, Lemons, and the FTC Minimum
Quality Standards in the Retail Used Automobile Industry, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 129 (Jan. 1983).
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warranties, i.e., ones consistent with buyers' preferences and sellers' costs and
that attempt to mitigate ancillary insurance-based problems, absent any
mandatory requirements, Part VII considers some of the adverse implications
that are likely to arise from the adoption of mandatory warranty legislation.
I. THE USED CAR MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES
Every year the sales and operation of used cars in the United States
increases. In 1993, 95.6% of the 121 million cars registered in the United
States were produced before 1993.14 Even ten years earlier, the percentage of
used cars in operation was 95.4% of the total registered fleet of passenger cars.
In 1993, approximately 9.8 million used cars were sold for an aggregate price
of $150 billion.15 By 1996, one commentator and market analyst had
suggested that this industry will grow to a dollar volume of between $200 and
$300 billion. 16 In 1993, for every $2.12 spent on new cars, American
purchasers spent one dollar on a used car. About 33% of the total value of
automobile purchases went for used car purchases. In the mid- 1980s, this ratio
of the automotive sales dollar was $3.66 for new cars to each dollar spent on
used vehicles-that is, only 21 % of all automobile expenditures went for used
car purchases.17
This trend toward the increasing importance of the used car fleet and sales
will continue.8 Better made and better maintained cars are lasting longer, and
more will be resold through the secondhand market. The median age of cars
in the United States has increased steadily. In 1980, the median age of the
passenger car fleet was 6.0 years; by 1993 the median age had increased by
22% to 7.3 years.' 9 Although car owners can defer new purchases during
economic bad times, there is no evidence that the trend toward cars lasting
longer is solely due to delayed purchasing. Indeed, national production and
unemployment rates were very similar in 1980 and 1993.2o In addition to cars
14. See AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERSASSOCIATION, AAMA MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS
AND FIGURES 39 (1994) [hereinafter AAMA].
15. See Michael Clements, A Drive to Used Cars, Dealers Try to Shake Slimy Image, USA TODAY,
Dec. 28, 1993, at lB.
16. This dollar volume increase will be caused by more used cars being sold and the average price
of a used car increasing. See Paul A. Eisenstein, Cruising the Auto Mega Mart, WORLD TRAVELER,
International Edition (Northwest Airlines), May 1996, at 60, 61-64.
17. These estimates are based on personal consumption expenditures for new autos and net
purchases for used vehicles. See AAMA, supra note 14, at 60.
18. A recent National Automobile Dealers Association report suggested that two reasons for this
continued growth are "the rapidly increasing prices of new cars and an ample supply of spiffy, low-
mileage used cars." Tim Cavanaugh, Classy Used Chassis, 18 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 21 (July 1996).
19. See AAMA, supra note 14, at 39.
20. The capacity utilization rate for all industries was 82.1% in 1980 and 81.9% in 1993. See
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 327 tbl. B-52 (1994). For all civilian workers the unemployment
rate was 7.1% in 1980 and 6.8 % in 1993. See id. at 314 tbl. B-40. Both the capacity utilization rate and
the unemployment rate are standard measures of how effectively the overall economy is using its
resource base. The unemployment rate measures the percentage of individuals who are willing and able
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lasting longer, the increase in leased passenger car activity will put more used
cars on the road. Between 1973 and 1983, the number of individually leased
passenger cars rose by two-thirds from just under a million units to almost 1.7
million. From 1983 to 1993, the increase was nearly 50%, with 2.4 million
units now in the leased passenger car fleet. Moreover, an additional 7.9 million
passenger cars in 1993 were in leased fleets of four or more cars (primarily in
corporate and rental car fleets).2 As these leases expire, these cars will enter
the used car market. As a result, according to one source, dealers anticipate
moving more than 30 million used car units per year.22 Although there is no
single explanation for the growth in the size of the used car market, attractive
pricing relative to new cars, better maintenance and quality of used cars, as
well as more buyers in the market all contribute to the growth of this market.
This marked growth in the size and scale of the used car market is leading
to changed sales and operating practices. Some companies are setting up new
types of factories to recondition thousands of used cars for resale.2 3 The role
of the used car lot at new car dealerships is being expanded, highlighted, and
promoted. Firms from non-automotive industries are entering the used market
as sellers and brokers, based on the success of Circuit City's operation outside
of Atlanta.24 In addition, used car dealers are offering more and expanded
terms, including warranties and service contracts.
25
The used car market is highly competitive. Indeed, there is not just one
market for used cars, but many. As economic theory suggests, since the
transport cost to value ratio is high for used cars, markets are localized with
to work but do not have a job, or underutilization of human resources. Similarly, the capacity utilization
rate is the percentage of buildings, machinery, and equipment which is both available and being used-a
measure of the capital stock employment. See GARY E. CLAYTON & MARTIN GERHARD GIESBRECHT,
A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY ECONOMIC STATISTICS 44-45, 47-48 (1990). The basic way in which capacity
utilization is measured is to define a standard operating time (e.g., one eight-hour shift per day, six days
a week) for a particular industry, and compare that with actual production time used during a given
interval. A utilization rate of less than 100% indicates that not all of the standard operating capacity in
the economy was being employed, in the same way that an unemployment rate of more than zero
indicates that not all of the labor resources were being employed. These two measures are frequently
used to indicate the overall operating conditions of the economy. See ALBERT T. SOMMERS, THE U.S.
ECONOMY DEMYSTIFIED, 75-92 (1985). When considering changes in one industry over time it is
important to compare equivalent economic conditions, so that any industry changes observed are not
likely to be the result of overall economic performance changes, but rather reflect changed circumstances
for just the industry under study.
21. See AAMA, supra note 14, at 54.
22. See James Bennet, Auto Makers' New Idea: Focus on Used-Car Sales, N.Y. TIMES. July 23,
1994, at Al.
23. Factory reconditioning has been established in America and in Britain. See id. For a more
complete discussion of how U.S. sellers are responding to the increased demand for used cars, see Mary
Flowers Boyce, A New Breed of Used Car Buyers, DEALER Bus., Nov. 1993, at 48.
24. The Circuit City company is Car Max. See Clements, supra note 15. In addition to Circuit
City's Car Max, NADA reports that "nine of the nation's largest auto dealers announced plans to open
a chain of giant used-car dealerships called Driver's Mart Worldwide." Cavanaugh, supra note 18, at
22.
25. See infra notes 51-54, 165-171 and accompanying text.
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little effort directed at moving units from one market to another. Within any
market there are many sellers and buyers. Entry into the used car market is
particularly easy with limited regulation,26 required training, and transaction
costs. In fact, non-merchant sellers can dominate a local market. While no one
tracks completely the number of used car sellers, one industry observer
2 7
believes that 50% to 60% of sales occur through private transactions, non-
merchant sales through newspaper advertisements, magazine give away notices,
and word of mouth. In addition to private sales, formal markets for used cars
exist in every urban area, accounting for more than 70% of the United States
population. Formal markets include not just used car dealers and new car
dealerships selling trade-ins, but also rental car companies disposing of their
fleets to individual buyers, and wholesale markets in which dealers and
individuals can participate. Of course, unlike the new car market with a finite
number of major sellers, the concentration ratio in any used car market is
likely to be very low, a sufficient condition for competition.28
Finally, the competitive nature of the used car market is enhanced by the
number of good substitutes. A buyer interested in an automobile can choose
between new and used cars, among various models and styles, and between
purchasing and leasing. In most urban markets, buyers can choose between
owning (or leasing) a car and using public transit. It is even the case that a
large fraction of buyers could forego the purchase of a car by relying on
alternative, non-automotive forms of movement. With many good and attractive
substitutes for used cars and many sellers among which to choose, the market
26. In most jurisdictions, dealers have to comply with statutes that require obtaining a license prior
to engaging in the business of selling of automobiles. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 11700 (West 1995);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 57 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 168.27(3) (1994); N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 415 (Law. Co-op. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.021 (West 1994). To obtain a
license a person must pay a fee. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 5 (no more than $100); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. § 415.6 ($25 application, $150 annual renewal); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.70.061 ($500
initial, $250 annual renewal). In some jurisdictions an individual must post a surety bond, see WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.70.070 ($15,000); have a place of business, see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 59;
MiNN. STAT. § 168.27(l0)(1)(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.023; and an area to display motor
vehicles, see WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.023. A license may be denied for a variety of reasons related
to the applicant's fitness to be a dealer, including convictions for offenses such as dealing in stolen cars.
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 11703(d); MiNN. STAT. § 168.27(11); N.Y. LAW VEH. & TRAF. § 415.9
(fraud or misleading conduct); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.101(ii). Similarly, a license may be
suspended or revoked for inappropriate dealer behavior. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 168.27(12) (odometer
tampering); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.101 (dealing in stolen vehicles). Although the requirements for
obtaining and retaining a license impose costs on used car dealers, they do not present substantial
barriers to entry that make the market uncompetitive.
27. Clements, supra note 15.
28. The importance of wholesale used car auction markets in the U.S. and how the wholesale and
retail markets are linked in a particular (Chicago area) local car market are presented in David
Genesove, Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market, 101 J. POL. EcON. 644 (1993).
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for used cars meets the necessary and sufficient conditions to be competi-
tive.
29
II. WARRANTY LAW WITHOUT MANDATORY WARRANTY LEGISLATION
Although a new car generally is sold with warranties,30 a used car,
including one sold by a dealer, may not be, subjecting the buyer to the risk of
product failure.3 Concerned about the existence of defects in cars sold by
dealers,32 the Federal Trade Commission adopted a rule in 1984 requiring
29. Evidence, based on price elasticities, that good alternatives to private vehicle use exist is
presented in KENNETH A. SMALL, URBAN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS (1992); evidence of
alternatives based on policy responses is presented in ANTHONY DOWNS, STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING
WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION (1992).
30. In the sale of a new car, the manufacturer ordinarily makes an express warranty, and an implied
warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314. Since the manufacturer's express warranty ordinarily
constitutes a written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 (1982), the manufacturer is precluded from disclaiming or
modifying the implied warranty of merchantability if the vehicle is a consumer product sold to a
consumer. See 15 U.S.C.A. at § 2308. The new car dealer frequently makes no express warranty to the
buyer but makes an implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314.
31. If a seller fails to warrant under U.C.C. § 2-313 that a product such as a car shall have certain
attributes, and effectively disclaims any implied warranties under U.C.C. § 2-316, there is no breach
of contract if the seller delivers a car that fails to possess such attributes or the attributes that would be
implied by law. Even though a used vehicle is sold without a warranty, a buyer may have a claim or
basis for rescission for nondisclosure, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977); misrepresentation; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 162; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525; and deceptive trade practices, see, e.g.,
15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020.
32. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SALE OF USED CARS, FINAL STAFF REPORT TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE, 16 C.F.R. § 455, (1978)
(hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]. The staff report is part of a protracted FTC rule-making process
pertaining to warranties and misrepresentations in the sale of used cars by dealers. In 1973, the Seattle
Office of the FTC began a study of used car sales practices, a study which was continued by the staff
of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the direction of the FTC. See id. at 1. Thereafter, Title I of
the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act directed the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to originate a used motor vehicle rule by January 4, 1976. See 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b)
(1975). The FTC promulgated two notices of proposed rulemaking; 41 Fed. Reg. at 1089 (1976); 41
Fed. Reg. at 20896; for a rule that would have required a used car dealer to post a sticker on a vehicle
window disclosing any known work that had been done on a vehicle, the extent of warranty coverage,
and other information. The staff received written comments pertaining to the notices, and conducted
hearings through May 4, 1977. 41 Fed. Reg. at 39337. Consumer groups, used car dealers, dealer
associations, law enforcement officials, auto rental and leasing associations, and other interested parties
commented at the hearings. 46 Fed. Reg. at 39337 n. 11. In addition the staff received a number of FTC
funded research reports. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra, at 4. Based on this evidence, the staff prepared
the FTC Staff Report. The report recommended adoption of an expanded dealer disclosure rule, one
which would have required used car dealers to inspect vehicles for and disclose defects. Id. at app. F.
Based on post-record comments, the staff and the Bureau of Consumer Protection recommended that
the FTC replace the mandatory dealer inspection requirement with an optional inspection requirement.
46 Fed. Reg. at 41328, 41330 (1981). On April 14, 1981, the FTC rejected both versions of the rule,
adopting instead a rule that required a dealer to disclose on a window sticker information about a car
including any warranty and certain mechanical defects known to the dealer at the time of the sale. 46
Fed. Reg. 41328-78 (1981). The FTC submitted this rule to Congress on September 9, 1981 pursuant
to Section 21 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which required the FTC to submit any final rule
to Congress for review. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (Supp. IV 1980). In Senate Concurrent Resolution 60,
Congress vetoed the rule. 128 CONG. REC. S5402 (daily ed. May 18, 1982); 128 CONG. REC. H2883
(daily ed. May 26, 1982). In Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d
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dealers to place a sticker in the windows of cars informing buyers whether the
vehicles are being sold with or without a warranty.33 Since the FTC promul-
gated its rule, a number of states have adopted or considered legislation
mandating warranties in the sale of used cars by dealers.
Aside from mandatory warranty legislation, Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code governs the existence and creation of warranties.34 Under
the Code, there are two types of warranties, express and implied. A seller
creates an express warranty by any affirmation, promise or description"
which relates to the goods sold and which becomes part of the "basis of the
bargain"36 between the seller and the buyer. Any written or oral statement by
the seller that meets these requirements, and that is more than a mere
commendation of a good or "puffing, "" is sufficient to be an express
warranty. An express warranty, therefore, consists of some voluntary
manifestation or representation on the part of a seller which forms the basis of
the warranty. An implied warranty, on the other hand, arises independently of
any manifestation by a seller; rather, it is based on the characteristics of the
sales transaction. A warranty that goods shall be merchantable applies to a sale
if the seller is a "merchant with respect to goods" of the kind involved in the
sale.38 To be merchantable, a good must at least be fit for its ordinary
575, 576 (D.C. 1982), the court held the veto resolutions unconstitutional for violating the principle of
separation of powers. On August 9, 1983, the FTC decided to reconsider the rule to determine if
modifications were appropriate. 49 Fed. Reg. 45692, 45694 (1984). As a result of further comment,
the FTC adopted the current rule, which requires the dealer to disclose on a window sticker whether
the vehicle is warranted, but does not require the dealer to disclose knowledge of certain mechanical
defects. Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1996).
33. See 16 C.F.R. § 455.2. In addition to the FTC rule, Congress adopted the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act in 1982. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301. The Act governs the issuance of warranties in the sale of
consumer products, but has limited relevance to the sale of used automobiles since the Act primarily
applies to warrantors who give written express warranties of the type denominated by the statute. See
id. Used car dealers do not appear to give the express written warranties of the type covered by the Act
with much frequency.
34. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute currently are revising Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code. None of the revisions,
however, would affect the substance of express or implied warranties as discussed in this Article. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 2, SALES, Discussion Draft (July 1996).
35. An express warranty can also be created by model or sample. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989).
36. See Thomas J. Holdych & Bruce Mann, The Basis of the Bargain Requirement: A Market and
Economic Based Analysis of Express Warranties-Getting What You Pay For and Paying For What You
Get, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 781 (1996) (discussing and providing model for "basis of the bargain"
requirement).
37. See Webb Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 525 A.2d 57, 62-63 (Conn. 1987)
(statements that car is in "mint," "excellent," or "unusual" condition not express warranties); Pell City
Wood, Inc. v. Forke Bros. Auctioneers, Inc., 474 So. 2d 694, 695 (Ala. 1985) (statement that truck
is in "good condition" not express warranty); Miller v. Lentine, 495 A.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Me. 1985)
(statement that motor is in "perfect running condition" not express warranty); Guess v. Lorenz, 612
S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (representation that "car is in good shape" not express warranty,
but merely commendation or puffing); Winningham v. Timber Prods. Corp., 1990 WL 14567 *3-4
(Tenn. App. 1990) (statement that bulldozer in "A-1 condition" not express warranty).
38. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989).
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purposes or pass without objection in the trade. 39 An implied warranty that
goods shall be fit for a particular, rather than their ordinary, purpose arises if
the seller has reason to know of the particular purpose and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment in providing appropriate goods."
Thus, if a dealer knew that a buyer were relying on her to furnish a vehicle
that would pull an unusually heavy trailer, an implied warranty would be
created that a vehicle sold by the dealer to the buyer would be capable of
performing that task.4
Although warranties may be created under the above circumstances, they
may be excluded or modified by the parties to a sale. So long as they comply
with certain formalities, such as mentioning the word "merchantability,"
parties to a sale can disclaim or modify the implied warranties of merchantabil-
ity and fitness for purpose.42 Moreover, a seller can disclaim implied
warranties with representations such as that the sale is "as is."" Antecedent
express warranties can be excluded if the parties adopt a writing as the final
embodiment of their contract terms, and the warranty either contradicts a term
in the writing or the writing constitutes the entire agreement between the two
parties. 44
Thus under the Uniform Commercial Code the creation and exclusion or
modification of warranties is left to freedom of contract. The parties can
determine for themselves the content of any warranty terms. The implied
warranties provided by the Code serve simply as standard form "gap fillers,"
reducing bargaining costs by supplying the warranty obligations that the law
assumes the parties would prefer. These gap fillers can be excluded or
39. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314(2)(a),(c).
40. See U.C.C. § 2-315.
41. See Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 292 N.E.2d 168, 173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
(defendant's knowledge that plaintiff was relying on defendant to select automobile for plaintiffs
business as salesman sufficient to create warranty that vehicle was suited for that purpose).
42. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2). To modify or exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, the
parties must use the term "merchantability," and if the exclusion or modification is in writing it must
be conspicuous. An exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose
must be in writing and conspicuous. As discussed in note 71, infra, a number of jurisdictions preclude
the modification or disclaimer of implied warranties in consumer transactions.
43. Implied warranties can also be excluded or modified as a result of buyer inspection which ought
to reveal defects, and by course of dealing or performance and usage of trade. See U.C.C. §§ 2-
316(3)(a),(b),(c). 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 precludes the use of a simple "as is" statement in the sale of used
cars by a dealer. Rather, the rule requires a window sticker which says "as is-no warranty." The FTC
required inclusion of the no warranty language based on a staff study finding that a number of
consumers do not know what "as is" means. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 262.
44. See U.C.C. § 2-202; Bushendorf v. Freightliner Corp., 13 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1993)
("integration" clause in contract precluded introduction of oral warranties); Southerland v. Northeast
Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (writing intended to be complete embodiment
of contract terms barred oral warranties); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 296 A.2d 269, 271 (Ver. 1972)
(term in writing disclaiming external warranties barred oral representations made by seller).
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modified as the parties prefer so long as the parties comply with the formal
rules for exclusion or modification set forth in the Code.
45
III. PERCEIVED DEFICIENCIES IN ExISTING WARRANTIES AND WARRANTY
LAW
Empirical data pertaining to warranties sold by used cars dealers are
difficult to obtain. It appears, however, that many if not most vehicles,
particularly older and high mileage ones, are sold without a warranty, express
or implied.46 Similarly, the data available on the nature of warranties are
rather sparse. The most comprehensive analysis of warranty terms is the
Federal Trade Commission staff report on the sale of used cars.4 7 Copies of
warranties the authors of this Article have obtained, one used on a national
basis and the other throughout a single state,48 contain some terms that may
be more substantial than those found in warranties reviewed by the FTC, but
others that are comparable.
Various deficiencies have been perceived in used car warranties and in the
law regulating such warranties. Although some used cars are sold with express
warranties, there is alleged to be a "wide disparity"49 in their terms, the
implication being that some, if not many, warranties provide inadequate
protection. Coverage may vary with respect to the parts covered, the duration
of the warranties, and the nature of the remedy should the warranties be
breached.5" Many warranties cover parts such as drivetrain components5 but
45. Several cases have held disclaimers of warranty complying with the requirements of U.C.C.
§ 2-316 unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2-302. See, e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296
(6th Cir. 1985); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982).
46. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 250-52 ("as is" sales widespread); 1991 REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOTIVE
SAFETY, SALES, AND SERVICE app. C, at 10-11 [hereinafter 1991 WASH. ATT'Y GEN. REP.] (indicating
that used car purchasers in State of Washington could purchase car "as is" with no warranty, or
purchase car with service contract but with no warranty). Although many, if not most, used cars may
be sold without a warranty, a substantial percentage are sold with service contracts. According to the
National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), in 1993, 29.8% of used cars sold by dealers were
sold with a service contract. See Letter from Thomas Webb, Chief Economist, NADA (July 26, 1994)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter NADA Auto Executive]. Although a service contract may not assure
that a car is defect-free or possesses certain attributes at the time of purchase, it may, as literature for
one contract plan represents, "minimize the uncertainty of purchasing a used vehicle" by providing for
repair of a defect preexisting the sale of a vehicle, at least to the extent that the defect was not obvious
prior to sale. Ford Extended Service Plan (1994) (on file with authors). The content of service contracts
is discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 165-71 infra.
47. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32.
48. The authors obtained two warranties, one issued by CIM Insurance Corporation in conjunction
with General Motors, and the other a standard form provided by the Washington State Independent
Automobile Dealers Association to its member dealers. In addition, the authors obtained a number of
service contracts issued by national companies including automobile manufacturers.
49. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 261.
50. See id. at 253.
51. See, e.g., Dealer's Limited Warranty (Washington State Independent Automobile Dealers
Association) (engine, transmission, drive axle and other parts individually negotiated between dealer and
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exclude items such as tires and batteries 2.5  Warranties vary in duration from
thirty days or 1000 miles to twelve months or 12,000 miles.5 3 Warranties also
vary in their allocation of the responsibility for the cost of repair, repair being
a typical remedy for breach of warranty. Many warranties allocate the costs
between dealer and the purchaser, sometimes on a 50-50 basis.54 Some
perceive these warranties as meaningless. 55 Since the dealer and not a market
sets the price of repairs, the dealer can establish a greatly inflated price, and
the consumer will pay the entire actual cost of repair.56 In addition, even
when the warranty covers some or all of the actual costs of repairs, there is no
incentive for the dealer to repair the vehicle in a reasonable time, and the
buyer incurs substantial consequential losses as a result of the dealer's
procrastination.5 7
Some buyers are thought not to understand the nature of warranty terms,
58
and this misunderstanding is believed to lead to inefficient purchase decisions.
This belief is predicated on the false assumption59 that buyers must be fully
informed for the market for warranty terms to operate efficiently.'
purchaser); Value Guard Automobile Mechanical Limited Warranty (engine, transmission, transaxle and
front or rear wheel .drive) (warranties on file with authors).
52. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 255-56.
53. See id. at 254 (older cars); "Off-Lease" Cars Back on Lots, Are Sold With New Warranties,
INSIGHT 31 (Apr. 17, 1995) (Toyota cars sold at end of lease with 12 month, 12,000 mile warranty);
James B. Treece, With Deals This Good, Why Settle for New?, Bus. WEEK 81 (Jul. 3, 1989) (Mercedes-
Benz selling used cars with fewer than 100,000 miles with 12-month warranty).
54. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 257-58; see also Dealer's Limited Warranty, supra
note 51 (allocation of repair cost individually negotiated between dealer and purchaser).
55. See Martha M. Post (Comment), New York's Used-Car Lemon Low: An Evaluation, 35 BuFF.
L. REv. 971, 976 (1986).
56. See id. This contention is highly disputable under traditional contract analysis. The meanings
to be given to the terms "cost" and "price" would either be those subjectively attached to the terms by
the purchaser, since the dealer would probably know or have reason to know of the buyer's meaning,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 9-201 (1979), or would be an objective meaning based
on what a reasonable person would understand the terms to mean under the circumstances. See E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.9 (1990).
57. Cf. Post, supra note 55, at 1002. The Ford Extended Service Plan and the Wynn's Bumper to
Bumper Protection (Warranty Administration Corporation) provide that if the promisor fails to either
repair or pay for repair of a vehicle within 60 days after the purchaser files a claim, the purchaser may
file a claim with the insurance company insuring the promisor's obligations under the service contract.
58. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 281-84.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.
60. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 261. A further perceived deficiency with respect
to express warranties is the operation of the parol evidence rule. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. Prior to purchase, a dealer may make a representation that would qualify as an express warranty;
but the dealer then uses a written contract which provides either that there are no express warranties
other than those in the writing, or that the writing represents the entire contract between the parties. By
operation of the parol evidence rule, U.C.C. § 2-202, each of these devices precludes the dealer's
antecedent representation from becoming an express warranty governing the transaction. See cases cited
supra note 44. A buyer may introduce evidence of the representation, however, if she can prove it was
fraudulent. See Tinker v. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 459 So. 2d 487 (Fla. App. 1984) (buyer can
introduce parol evidence in case of fraud); Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 552 P.2d 881 (Kan.
1976) (finding that if dealer's representation were fraudulent or deceptive trade practice, buyer could
introduce statement to prove fraud or violation of deceptive trade practices statute); Teague Motor Co.
v. Rowton, 733 P.2d 93 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (same). Despite this function of the parol evidence rule,
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With respect to implied warranties, consumers are perceived to be ignorant
either of the existence or content of such warranties or the requirements for
their disclaimer.61 The concept of merchantability in particular is considered
difficult to understand. Despite their ignorance of implied warranties,
consumers expect a dealer to cure vehicle defects62 or are considered to have
a legitimate expectation that a seller is responsible for the quality of goods that
she sells.63
The problem is compounded by consumer ignorance of the various
requirements for the disclaimer of implied warranties.' Although the FTC has
attempted to alleviate part of that ignorance by requiring the posting of stickers
on used cars sold by dealers stating that the term "as is" means "no warran-
ty, " ' some states have imposed requirements beyond those set forth in
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and (3) for disclaiming implied warranties.6' Ignorance
may result in failure to recognize either that implied warranties have been
disclaimed or that such warranties continue to exist because of ineffective
disclaimers.
The implicit conclusion of these analyses of consumer ignorance and
misunderstanding is that there is a market failure. Because consumers do not
understand or are not aware of warranty terms, the market is believed not to
provide appropriate terms. The perceived market failure in warranty terms
results in part in used automobiles being sold with excessive defects. Dishonest
dealers are thought to have no incentive to disclose defects in their cars since
they can sell their cars at the same price as honest dealers who reveal defects
to buyers.67 The market will not discipline dishonest sellers since buyers are
considered unable to distinguish between them and honest dealers.68 If honest
sellers with good quality cars are unable to differentiate themselves from
dishonest sellers, conventional analysis indicates that the owners of good cars
consumers may still believe that the antecedent representation is part of the transaction.
61. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 289-90; 1991 WASH. ATr'Y GEN. REP., supra note
46, at 10.
62. See FTC STAFF REPORT. supra note 32, at 291.
63. See 1991 WASH. ATr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 46, at 12, 18; Post, supra note 55, at 972.
64. See 1991 WASH. ATr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 46, at 10.
65. See 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (1996).
66. In Washington, for example, in addition to meeting the other requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316,
a seller must particularize the attributes not being warranted, see WASH. REV. CODE § 62A 2-316(4)
(1995), and in some instances individually negotiate the disclaimer. See Berg v. Stromme, 484 P.2d 380
(Wash. 1971) (warranty ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated and set forth with particularity); see also
Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (same); Thomas J. Holdych
& George Ferrell, Individual Negotiation of Warranty Disclaimers: An Economic Analysis of an
Assumedly Market Enhancing Rule, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 237 (1990) (criticizing Washington
statute and cases requiring individual negotiation and particularization of disclaimed attributes in
disclaimers).
67. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 132.
68. See id.
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will keep them off the market.69 As a result, the quality of used cars in the
market will deteriorate, and the equilibrium price will be that for inferior cars,
a result of what is characterized as the "lemons" problem.7"
IV. MANDATORY WARRANTY LAWS
Enacted in seven jurisdictions since the mid-1980s,7  mandatory warranty
legislation for used automobiles contains several provisions to respond to the
perceived deficiencies of the market. Such legislation provides that any sales
by a used car dealer must include an express warranty72 when the vehicle is
purchased by a consumer or for nonbusiness use.73 Generally, the warranty
69. See Akerlof, supra note 7.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-220 to 42-260 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 481J (Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NV (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325F.662 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-69 (West 1996); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b
(McKinney 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5.4-1 to 31-5.4-6 (1995). Legislation mandating express
warranties in the sale of used cars by dealers came under consideration during and shortly after passage
of new car "lemon laws," generally in the early 1980s. Such lemon laws commonly require a new car
manufacturer to replace or give a refund for a new vehicle which fails to conform to a warranty, after
a specified number of attempts at repair. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 42-179; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118 (West 1989). See generally BARKLEY CLARK
& CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES, § 7.03[5] (1984) (providing overview
of new car lemon laws); Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties and
a Proposalfor Reform, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 589. Some other, early and later, attempts to pass used car
warranty legislation resulted in failure. See 1991 WASH. ATr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 46 (proposing
legislation that was not enacted in Washington); The Hearts Are Bleeding for the Car Dealers This
Afternoon, UPI, Apr. 19, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing initial failure
of Connecticut to pass legislation requiring used car dealers to provide warranties on cars selling for
more than $1500); Timothy Kenny, UPI, Apr. 17, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
(discussing proposed legislation in Oregon). Such legislation was first adopted in New York and Rhode
Island. See 1984 N.Y. Laws 645; 1985 R.I. Pub. Laws § 1, ch. 342 §1. Proponents of the legislation
consisted, at least in part, of consumer groups such as the Connecticut Public Interest Research Group
and the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group. See Bay State Tries to Give "Lemon Law"
Safeguards to Used Car Buyers, CHRISTAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 12, 1984, at 6; Kenny, supra.
Arguments in favor of the legislation pointed to the number of defects occurring in used cars shortly
after purchase, the increase in the number of used cars being sold, and the increased price of used cars.
See Bay State Tries to Give "Lemon Law" Safeguards to Used Car Buyers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 12, 1984, at 6; Thomas Conroy, UPI, Oct. 28, 1984 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File. The principal opponents of the legislation consisted of used car dealers and their associations. See
Conroy, supra at 6. Opponents argued that the legislation would increase the price of used cars sold by
dealers, cause purchasers to buy cars in states not having such legislation, and drive dealers out of
business. See id. Moreover, they argued that used car dealers sold cars with warranties, at least those
cars with a higher price. See id. In addition to legislation mandating express warranties in the sale of
used cars, some jurisdictions preclude disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability, including
in the sale of used cars. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-316
(1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 2-316 (West 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A § 2-316 (1994).
72. In some states the warranty must be in writing. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(a);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2.
73. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-221(a)-(c); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 481-J-1 to
481-J-2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 4(2)(A)(i); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.662 subds. 1
to 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-69; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 198-b (a)-(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5.4-1
to 31-5.4-2.
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must cover all defects that would impair the safety or use of the vehicle,74 or,
alternatively, any defects or malfunctions in a specified list of parts. 75 The
warranty must cover the full cost of parts and labor with respect to a covered
defect.76 Warranty duration varies with mileage' and, in one state, the
purchase price of the car.78 The warranties run for thirty to ninety days or
1000 to 4000 miles, whichever comes first.79
The laws generally exclude from mandatory coverage sales between
dealers'0 or for business use, and general maintenance such as normal tune-
ups" and the consequences of normal wear.' All contain provisions de-
signed to deal with the problem of moral hazard;83 they exclude from
coverage defects or malfunctions resulting from consumer abuse, accident,
vandalism, negligence or lack of maintenance.'
For breach of warranty, the legislation provides that the dealer shall
repair,' or pay the buyer to repair, the vehicle. 6 If the dealer fails to repair
74. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b) (mechanically operational and sound); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N (2)(A)(i).
75. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(c); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.662 subd. 2(b)-
(d); N.Y.GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b(b)(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2(b)(2).
76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(c).
77. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 4(2)(B);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.662 subd. 2; N.Y.GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-
2(a).
78. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b).
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b) (30 days or 1500 miles if price is between
$3000 and $5000; 60 days or 3000 miles if price is $5000 or more); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-
2(b) (90 days or 5000 miles for cars with less than 25,000 miles; 60 days or 3000 miles for cars with
less than 50,000 miles; 30 days or 1000 miles for cars with less than 75,000 miles); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90 §7N'A (B) (90 days or 3750 miles for cars with less than 40,000 miles; 60 days or 2500
miles for cars with less than 80,000 miles; 30 days or 1250 miles for cars with less than 125,000 miles);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 324F.662 subd. 2(a) (60 days or 2500 miles for cars with less than 36,000 miles;
30 days or 1000 miles for cars with less than 75,000 miles); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-69 (90 days or
3000 miles for cars with less than 24,000 miles; 60 days or 2000 miles for cars with less than 60,000
miles; 30 days or 1000 miles for cars with more than 60,000 miles); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b(b)
(90 days or 4000 miles for cars with less than 36,000 miles; 60 days or 3000 miles for cars with less
than 80,000 miles; 30 days or 1000 miles for cars with less than 100,000 miles); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-
5.4-2(a) (60 days or 3000 miles for cars with 36,000 miles or less; 30 days or 1000 miles for cars with
less than 100,000 miles).
80. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(c)(2).
81. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(d)(4); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-
b(b)(4)(e); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2(e)(5).
82. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(b)(4)(j).
83. Moral hazard is a problem that arises when a person is fully insured against the adverse
consequences of an event. The person may be indifferent between non-occurrence of the event and
receipt of the insurance payment. In that event, the person is likely to fail to take cost-effective measures
to protect against the event occurring, and may indeed engage in behavior likely to cause the event to
occur. As a result, the likelihood of the event occurring is increased.
84. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-7(b)(2);
MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 90 §§ 7NV4(3)(B)(i-iii); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F § 662 subd. 2(g);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-70; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b(b)(4)(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5.4-
2(e)(1),(2).
85. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N h(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F,
§ 662(2)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-70; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(b)(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 31-5.4-2(b)(2).
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within a specified period,' the dealer must refund the purchase price to the
buyer.88 In some instances the legislation provides for arbitration of disputes
between a buyer and dealer, and for public enforcement for certain violations
of the statute.
Based on the premise that the market and private ordering fail to provide
appropriate warranty terms, some of the legislation either prohibits waiver of
its provisions89 or allows waiver under limited conditions.' With one
exception, 9 the statutes that allow waiver of the warranty do so only if the
dealer identifies in writing a part as defective. 2
V. THE USED CAR WARRANTY MARKET
Whether the legislation described above is a necessary response to
deficiencies in the used car market depends on two factors. The first is the
structure of the used car market, and the second is the extent to which the
market can be expected to generate appropriate warranty terms. This Part
examines these two issues to determine whether imposing mandatory warranties
is an appropriate response to market deficiencies.
A. The Structure of the Used Car Market
It has been argued that markets will generate inappropriate warranty terms
if they are not competitive in nature.93 This contention is subject to the
criticism that in order to maximize profits even monopolists will provide the
terms preferred by buyers, albeit at i monopoly price.' Regardless, to the
extent one accepts the former argument, it does not apply to warranty terms
86. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b) (warranty must cover full cost of parts and
labor); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(c) (dealer must repair or reimburse buyer for full cost of
repair); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(b)(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2(b)(2) (dealer must
repair or reimburse buyer for cost of repair).
87. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N1,4(3)(A)(ii) (three attempts at repair or if the
car is out of service for 10 or more days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-71(c)(1) (three attempts presumed
reasonable opportunity to repair); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-b(c)(1) (dealer must repair within "a
reasonable period of time").
88. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NV4(3)(A)(ii); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F
§ 662 subd. 2(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-71; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(c)(1).
89. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(d)(1).
90. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(d); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-3(b); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 325F.662 subd. 4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-73.
91. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-73 (waiver allowed for vehicles with more than 60,000
miles which need not identify part).
92. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(d); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-3(b); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 325F.662 subd. 4.
93. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Friedrich Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632
(1943).
94. See Ronald H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 493,494 (1974); see also Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,
63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977).
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generated by used car markets. As discussed previously,95 the used car market
is competitive according to the standard tests of economic theory. First, large
number of sellers, both commercial and noncommercial, compete for
consumers' dollars. Second, competition extends over space-in any given area
there are numerous markets available to consumers. The high degree of
competition in the used car market is evident by the spatial structure of the
marketplace. Most commonly, the market is organized in a compact geographic
locale with many dealers located in close proximity. Third, consumers also
have numerous substitutes to purchasing particular used cars or purchasing
from a specific seller: purchasing new cars, buying from non-merchants,
maintaining an older car and foregoing purchasing, or using non-automotive
transportation. In addition, as predicted by the competitive market model,
sellers react to changing market conditions by altering prices to balance
inventory holdings and sales.' Consumers respond to new information about
automobile performance and consequently cause market prices to adjust,
following the pattern of change implied by a competitive market model.'
Consistent with the competitive paradigm, specialty institutions, most notably
the local wholesale auction, facilitate the movement of vehicles between dealers
in local markets.9" Finally, there are many buyers active in the market for
used cars. Given this evidence of the competitive character of used car
markets, there is no basis for requiring warranties based on the uncompetitive
nature of the market. 99
95. See supra text accompanying note 24.
96. Statistically significant discounts from "sticker prices" were exhibited in ten major urban
markets for two types of vehicles. See Noel M. Lavenka & Allen F. Jung, Automobile Prices and the
Value of Shopping, 15 J. CONSUMER STUD. & HOME ECON. 15, 17 (1991).
97. Consumers were able to differentiate experience data from experimental results on automobile
crash-worthiness, and market shares responded accordingly. See George E. Hoffer et al., Market
Responses to Publicly-Provided Information: The Case of Automotive Safety, 24 APPLIED ECON. 661
(1992). The competitive linkage between information about new vehicle performance and used vehicle
market prices is presented in Gregory B. Rodgers, All-Terrain Vehicles: Market Reaction to Risk
Information, 31 EcON. INQUIRY 29 (Jan. 1993).
98. Commenting on the wholesale auction market, Genesove notes "the auto auction is probably
as close as one can get to the idealized Walrasian exchange economy...." Genesove, supra note 28,
at 646. The Walrasian exchange economy is a competitive auctioneer construct where quantity
adjustments generate a competitive equilibrium.
99. As previously discussed, see infra text accompanying note 94, there is no reason to believe that
inadequate bargaining power of buyers, attributable to concentration of market power in sellers, is likely
to result in inferior warranty terms. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 YALE L. J. 1297 (1981) (finding no correlation between market concentration and warranty terms)
[hereinafter Priest, Consumer Product Warranty]. Moreover, the used car market is not concentrated
but highly competitive. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97. Nor is there reason to believe that
inappropriate warranty terms result from lack of buyer information about used car defects and their
costs. See infra text accompanying notes 110-139.
There is no reason to assume a market problem even if used cars are purchased predominantly by
lower income buyers. Low income buyers can be, and probably are, as knowledgeable and discerning
as higher income or new car buyers. Indeed, the same type of information from third parties (Consumer
Reports, e.g.) is available to low income purchasers. To the extent that a used car purchase may account
for a higher percentage of a lower income family's budget, that family would have a stronger incentive
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B. Market Creation of Appropriate Wrranty Terms
Given the competitive nature of the used car market, it is reasonable to
believe that dealers will provide attractive warranty terms in order to maintain
and expand market share. If the market is responsive to buyers' preferences,
the question is whether buyers will demand appropriate warranty terms.
Whether buyers will demand appropriate warranty terms depends on whether
buyers accurately assess the likelihood and cost of product failure. If buyers
have inaccurate information about product failure, they may demand either too
much or too little warranty protection.
One of the central contentions about the purported failures in the used car
market is that there is substantial asymmetry in the information about product
defects between dealers and buyers." ° Sellers have virtually complete
information about vehicle defects, based on inspections of cars prior to
purchase, inspections by third-party insurers in evaluating cars for insurance,
and preparation of cars for sale. 10' Additionally, merchant sellers (as opposed
to non-merchant sellers or individuals not dealing in used cars in the normal
course of business) have experience from trade information and past sales
activities to rely upon, and non-merchants have particularistic knowledge based
on their care and use of vehicles. Buyers, however, are considered to have
limited information about the defects in the cars they consider buying because
automobiles are complex products with defects that cannot be discovered by a
superficial inspection." Moreover, dealers tend to restrict buyer inspections
to a brief test drive.10 3 Inspections of this character are insufficient to reveal
many vehicle defects."
Were buyers' defect information limited as posited above, there would be
substantial reason to believe that buyers would demand and sellers provide
inappropriate warranty terms. In addition, if the existence of defects in used
automobiles is an event that occurs with low frequency, buyers may underesti-
mate that occurrence because of the difficulties in attributing correct probabili-
to investigate information and shop more carefully than a higher income family would. Moreover, lower
income implies lower opportunity cost for search activities, suggesting more a intensive search. These
conclusions are supported by research indicating that there is a negative correlation between income and
search, meaning that lower income people engage in more search. See Geoffrey C. Kiel & Roger A.
Clayton, Dimensions of Consumer Information Seeking Behavior, 18 J. MKTG. RES. 233, 237 (1981).
Hence, a low income purchaser should be a more informed buyer, less subject to market power.
100. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 71-99, 131.
101. See id. at 71-81.
102. See id. at 83-84.
103. See id. at 86-93. One alternative way for buyers to obtain more complete information is to
engage an independent expert. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). The FTC staff reports, however, that dealers
tend to restrict off-lot inspections by mechanics for buyers. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at
86-88.
104. See id. at 86-87.
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ties to such events. "o If buyers substantially underestimate the risk of product
failure, they will demand insufficient warranty protection since they will only
pay a price for warranty protection consistent with the level of perceived
product risk.
Treating buyer defect information as limited to that which is obtained by
buyer inspection prior to the purchase of a particular car is inappropriate.
Rather, in assessing whether buyers use sufficient information to demand
correct warranty terms, one must look at all the information buyers possess,
including that derived from prior transactions and third-party sources. So long
as a buyer can establish a correct expectation of the probability that a used car
has a defect, the fact that she lacks exact information about the defects in the
car is irrelevant. With that expectation and an accurate assessment of the
defect's cost, a buyer can demand appropriate warranty protection.
From what sources can a buyer establish such an expectation? The primary
source for most buyers is likely to be prior experience." °6 If the buyer
previously has purchased a used car from a dealer, the buyer has experience
with the level of defects in such cars. It might be contended that this
information could be inaccurate since it might be based on a limited,
unrepresentative sample."°7 The availability heuristic suggests that people rely
on information that is readily brought to mind even though it is not representa-
tive of all the information that exists.' This heuristic might be relevant if
the occurrence of defects in the purchase of used cars were not widely
distributed among purchasers of used cars, or if one were not concerned about
105. See Kabneman & Tversky, supra note 103.
106. Cf. Barry L Bayus, The Consumer Durable Replacement Buyer, 55 J. MKTG. 42 (1991)
(finding that 70% of automobiles purchased in 1986 and 1988 were replacement purchases); Howard
Beales et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 12 (1981) (suggesting that
consumer external search limited by wealth of internal information including past experience). Some
might contend that cognitive dissonance would preclude buyers from recognizing defects in their
vehicles. Cognitive dissonance is a state in which a person's beliefs and attitudes conflict with
anticipated behavior or past actions. See STEUART HENDERSON BRIrr, PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF
MARKETING AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 89 (1978). To avoid cognitive dissonance, people assimilate
such beliefs with the behavior or actions, thereby skewing their perception of information to achieve
consistency between their beliefs and action. Thus a buyer who may have read substantial literature and
formed the belief that a certain make of car was a good car might ignore or assimilate information about
bad performance of the car to avoid a conflict with the previously formed belief. See Richard L. Oliver,
An Interpretation of the Attitudinal and Behavioral Effects of Puffery, 13 J. CONSUMER AFF. 8 (Summer
1979). Buyers, however, are likely to contrast, as opposed to assimilate, information inconsistent with
prior beliefs when the problems confronted are substantial or costly. The purchase of another vehicle
also brings about a new event involving another vehicle at which time a buyer is not as likely to engage
in assimilation. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1436 (1983).
107. The buyer may have purchased a vehicle containing few defects, whereas the defect rate of
all automobiles the seller sells is quite high.
108. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11, 163-69 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982). Other forms of heuristics and problems with decision making under uncertainty can
be found in RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE (1994).
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the impact on warranty terms of information available to all buyers, particular-
ly marginal buyers, in the market. Yet data indicate that roughly one-third of
used car purchasers report defects in their cars, ' 9 and the information
available to all buyers, particularly marginal buyers who are concerned about
defects and warranty terms, is determinative in establishing what warranties the
market will offer."0 If buyers enter the market every five to ten years to
replace their vehicles, a substantial number of them at any given time are likely
to be repeat buyers who have encountered defects in their cars. To the extent
that automobile defects can result in substantial losses, these buyers are likely
to be sensitive to the existence and character of warranty terms. As will be
discussed below, the preferences of these buyers as marginal buyers will
determine the content of warranty terms. In addition to individual experiences
in purchasing a used car, purchasers obtain information from third party
sources such as friends, acquaintances, and publications such as Consumer
Reports and Road and Track."' Again, if one-third of all used car purchases
from dealers involve cars with defects, it is likely that an inquiring buyer will
obtain fairly representative information about the probability of defects." 2
As indicated above, buyers might demand incorrect warranty protection if
they underestimate the likelihood or cost of used car defects. People are
positioned to have difficulty in processing information about low probability
events and events that involve a very low cost." 3 For example, if asked to
assess the cost of an event with a one-tenth of a one percent chance of
109. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 46; Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer
Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and
Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 701, 705 (1977); Used Car Defects Being Fixed, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1990, at 76 (reporting that 33% of respondents in survey of used car buyers who
purchased vehicle with express warranty reported defect impairing safety or use of vehicle).
110. If the average cost of defects suffered by all buyers exceeds the cost at which a seller can
protect against the defect's occurrence and/or make repairs, the seller will provide a warranty if the
seller can protect against the defects or make repairs more cheaply than the buyers. Unless there is
market segmentation that allows the seller to discriminate among buyers, the seller will offer a warranty
based on the demand for such a term by buyers as a whole, which in turn will be based on information
available to all the buyers in the market (See infra note 129 for a discussion of when this type of
segmentation can occur). Of course, as we have discussed, see infra text accompanying note 128, the
seller ordinarily responds to the preferences and the information of so-called marginal buyers who are
particularly interested in the term in question. Since these buyers are particularly interested in the term
in question, it is reasonable to believe that they, at least as a group, have as good and probably better
information about the matter at issue, here defects and warranties, than the market as a whole.
111. See Monroe Friedman, Survey Data on Owner-reported Car Problems: How Useful to
Prospective Purchasers of Used Cars?, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 434, 435-37 (1987) (finding Consumer
Reports reliability surveys useful in predicting reliability of same make and model for ensuing year);
Michael J. Houston, Consumer Evaluations of Product Information Sources, in CURRENT ISSUES AND
RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 135, 139-40 (1979) (finding that consumers relied on third persons for
information about attributes such as durability for durable goods); cf. Ginter, et al. supra note 9 (finding
used car quality as indicated by Consumer Reports reliability surveys not reflected in price).
112. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 133 (stating that buyer can establish expectation
of probability that particular car contains defects).
113. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 103.
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occurring and inflicting a one cent loss, many people might respond that the
cost is zero. This response is attributable either to the psychological difficulty
of assessing low probability events or the cost of processing information with
so little value. However extensive these phenomena might be, they do not
appear to apply to defects in used cars sold by dealers. As indicated above,
one-third of used car purchasers report defects in the vehicles they purchase,
making the probability of such defects for consumers as a whole 33%. The
occurrence of these defects would not be low probability events. Second, a
1978 study 14 found that the mean reported cost of repairs for such defects
was $109.1" 5 This amount is not so trivial that buyers might be expected to
discount it substantially because of their inability to process low cost
events. 116
At least in the market for motor vehicles, there is growing empirical
literature suggesting that individual consumers are capable of assessing vehicle
related risks and forcing the market to adjust accordingly. Gregory B.
Rodgers' 7 analyzed the response of consumers and the market when risk
information concerning three- and four-wheel all-terrain vehicles became
public."' In particular, he assessed the impact of information implicit in a
consent decree imposing a stop-sale order on the sale of new three-wheel
ATVs." 9 He found the new information changed buyer behavior and caused
prices of more hazardous vehicles to decline by approximately the present
value of the associated risk. He concluded: "[T]he statistical results suggest
114. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32. An extensive search of the literature and numerous
discussions with representatives of the automotive industry revealed a paucity of quantitative repair data
for used cars. The primary reason is the cost and difficulty of coding repair records to indicate whether
the work was done on a vehicle that was bought new or used.
115. See id. at 59.
116. Although no more current data have been obtained on the mean cost of repairing used car
defects, it is implausible that the amount has decreased to a trivial level. Indeed, given inflation and the
practice of replacing entire parts or modules in newer model vehicles, it is probable that the cost has
risen substantially.
117. Rodgers, supra note 97.
118. All-Terrain Vehicles might be viewed as "different" from traditional automobiles in the sense
that they were "designed" for primarily off-road and recreational uses. However, certainly some (if not
many) ATV owners use their vehicles in the same manner (at least part of the time) as do owners of
more traditional vehicles. To some extent, then, ATVs have become like on-road, non-recreational
vehicles: used by some for work, commuting, family travel, and "about town" errands. Since ATVs
are sold both new and used, information about this sub-market is applicable to automobile markets in
general. The data from the ATV study, combined with the results of Hoffer et al., supra note 97,
provide the best data that vehicle buyers are generally able to absorb new information and bring it to
the market. The safety concerns and problems of ATVs became public information quickly. Consumers
were quick to respond to this information, forcing sellers to react by changing the production process
or reducing the price. See Rodgers, supra note 97.
119. The preliminary consent decree was entered in 1987, and the final in 1988. The decrees
involved sales of new three-wheel vehicles (but not new four-wheel ones) by American Honda Motors
Co., Yamaha Motor Co., Kawasaki Motor Corp., Suzuki Motor Corp., and Polaris Industries, L.P. See
United States vs. American Honda Motor Co., Preliminary Consent Decree, Civil Action 87-3523 (Dec.
30, 1987); United States v. American Honda Motor Co., Final Consent Decree, Civil Action 87-3525
(Apr. 28, 1988).
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that providing risk information to the public can alter consumer market
behavior . . . ."1 George E. Hoffer and his colleagues,' found that
consumers not only properly evaluate automotive safety information, but also
distinguish between laboratory test results and actual experience related data.
Consumers did not value crash test information provided by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as much as actual bodily
injury data released by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI).122 Consumer
purchases moved away from automobiles with poor HLDI reports and toward
models with better HLDI records. Consumers did not respond in a similar
manner to information presented by NHTSA reports. The NHTSA information
is generated by laboratory tests and the HLDI is privately collected insurance
industry data from actual crash reports. Because NHTSA data "exhibit little,
if any, correlation with the actual frequency of bodily loss experience,"' 23 the
authors conclude "the public's disregard of the government's crash test data
when making their purchase decisions may be rational."124 These studies
indicate that consumers not only do understand risk information, but that they
translate this information into changes in market behavior in a rational fashion.
Even if all buyers are not adequately informed about the probability or cost
of used car defects, or the existence or content of warranties, the used car
market will provide appropriate warranty terms if sufficient numbers of buyers
exist who are adequately informed and are concerned about the existence of
such terms. 12 In a competitive market, such as that for used cars, the
interaction of large numbers of buyers and sellers, some of whom have an
interest in and information about contract terms, produces the correct
terms. 126 Consumers who value contract terms will shop the market and
express the general sentiment of all buyers to sellers. To attract sufficient
buyers so that their marginal revenues from sales equal marginal costs,
127
120. Rodgers, supra note 97, at 37.
121. See Hoffer et al., supra note 97.
122. The authors conclude: "The hypothesis that consumers find the government's crash data of
little use is consistent with the evidence. "Id. at 665.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 666.
125. See Holdych & Ferrell, supra note 66, at 252-63; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 106, at 1409,
1425-42.
126. The fact that the used car segments of the market are spatially well-defined does not present
any problems. As long as some consumers shop between markets for comparison purposes, and as long
as advertising is offered to the entire market, the spatial separation of market areas will not alter the
competitive nature of the markets. Marginal buyers and shoppers will "move" information from one
market segment to another when profitable. Thus, information will flow between segments, preventing
monopoly-like behavior in any specific segment. The used car market is also subject to arbitrage. Should
prices in any spatial segment rise above general market levels, someone has an incentive to buy in the
low price segment and sell in the higher price segment. Indeed, the active regional wholesale markets
for used cars do exactly this.
127. A seller will seek to sell a quantity of goods where the last or marginal dollar of revenue from
selling the last item just equals the last or marginal cost of selling that item. A seller who sells more
items will incur a loss, since the incremental revenue from selling the item will be less than the cost of
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sellers will have to alter their prices, quality, and contract terms to be
acceptable to knowledgeable consumers. 12 Sellers who fail to respond to the
preferences of informed buyers are likely to lose market share and be driven
from the market. As long as some sellers try to respond to the preferences of
some buyers and the market is competitive, the market will provide appropriate
terms regardless of the overall knowledge or shopping behavior of all
buyers. 129 A competitive market, then, will provide terms suitable to buyers
and sellers without the particular terms of every sale having to be individually
negotiated. For competitive markets to establish efficient terms, it is not
necessary for all, or even many, buyers to have complete information about
product attributes, risks, and alternative terms. In fact most buyers will have
very little information in most cases. What is required is that there be some
buyers who are responsive to terms and who comparison shop. 3 °
Although no studies appear to examine the search or shopping behavior of
used car buyers, studies of shopping for consumer durables, including new
cars, and of the determinants of consumer search demonstrate the presence of
sufficient purchaser shopping to compel used car sellers either to provide the
terms buyers prefer or risk losing market share.1'1 Studies of the information-
seeking behavior of new car buyers indicate that such purchasers visit between
3.3 and 6.2 dealers prior to making a purchase.'32 Another study found that
only 34% of new car buyers visited only one dealer prior to purchase. 1
sale. A seller who sells less than this quantity will suffer a loss in the form of the foregone opportunity
that it could have taken advantage of by making the additional sale. See PETER PASHIGIAN, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1995).
128. When used car buyers have to obtain third-party financing, lenders will provide additional
information to buyers. In particular, to the extent that lenders rely on Blue Book guidelines for value
determination, the market, through the lenders' conditions on loan to value amounts, will provide
information about the "average" quality and condition of a used car. Blue Book prices for used cars are
adjusted for special features as well as mileage, implying that prior experience is relevant to current
prices.
129. Buyers who demand different terms than those prevailing on the market can negotiate
individually with sellers. Moreover, sellers will attempt to ascertain whether there are sufficient buyers
who prefer terms different from those offered generally, and markets will arise or "segment" in order
to meet those buyers' preferences. The general conditions under which separating equilibria will be
generated through market segmentation are discussed in ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOM-
IC THEORY 450-60 (1995). When the market will not support a separating equilibrium, the result will
be a pooled equilibrium where the terms are the same for all buyers. Under reasonable conditions
(competitive buyers and sellers and no barriers to entry or exit) both supporting and pooled equilibria
can be efficient.
130. See Holdych & Ferrell, supra note 66, at 252-53; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 106, at 1409.
131. See Sharon E. Beatty & Scott Smith, External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Several
Product Categories, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 83 (1987); Girish N. Punj & Richard Staelin, A Model of
Consumer Information Search Behavior for New Automobiles, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 366 (1983);
Narasimhan Srinivasan & Brian T. Ratchford, An Empirical Test of a Model of External Search for
Automobiles, 18 J. CONSUMER RES. 233 (1991).
132. See Bayus, supra note 106, at 46; Kiel & Clayton, supra note 99, at 236.
133. See John W. Newman & Richard Staelin, Prepurchase Information Seeking for New Cars and
Major Household Appliances, 9 J. MKTG. RES. 249, 250 (1972). These findings are consistent with
those of Westbrook and Fornell who found that 68 % of purchasers of major appliances visited more than
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With more than a majority of buyers visiting more than one dealer, sellers have
sufficient incentive to provide terms those buyers prefer or risk becoming
unprofitable. 3 ' Based on the determinants of consumer search, used car
buyers are likely to engage in more search than new car buyers. Evidence
tends to support the theory that consumers use a cost-benefit approach to
determining the amount of search in which they will engage.' 35 Thus when
consumers purchase higher priced, more complex products, 3 6 or when a
transaction involves a higher degree of risk,' consumers are likely to
engage in more search. Similarly, as search costs are lowered, for example, by
the close proximity of sellers to one another,' buyers are likely to conduct
more search. Finally, purchasers with lower incomes tend to search more than
buyers with higher incomes. 139
The characteristics of the used car market indicate that buyers in that
market are likely to engage in greater search or shopping than new car buyers.
The risk of a bad purchase is likely to be higher for a used car since it is more
likely to have undergone substantial use and to possess worn or defective parts.
Although lower than that for a new car, the price of the used car is still
relatively high. Sellers of used cars tend to be located in close proximity to one
another, thus reducing shopping costs. Finally, the income of used car buyers
is lower than that of new car buyers.
It is not only likely that there is substantial shopping by buyers in the used
car market, but also that a significant percentage of those buyers are interested
one dealer, with the mean number of stores visited being 2.7. See Robert A. Westbrook & Claes
Fornell, Patterns of Information Source Usage Among Durable Goods Buyers, 16 J. MKTG. RES. 303,
305, 307 (1979).
134. To determine what types of products, specific attributes or pricing strategy will be profitable
in the market, a seller does not need to know what every potential consumer thinks. Indeed, trying to
ascertain the preferences of everyone would be prohibitively costly. Rather, sellers rely on information
from the most concerned and product sensitive consumers, the marginal buyers. These buyers have an
interest in, concern for, and expressed desire to consider alternatives to what is available on the market.
Through market research, direct customer contact, or trial-and-error, profit maximizing sellers try to
.reach" these buyers. If sellers can attract the marginal buyers, those just willing to pay for a new
product or attribute, then the sellers will also attract all buyers who place a higher value on the new
product or attribute than do the marginal buyers. Thus, if a change in market terms is attractive to the
buyers on the margin, it will be profitable for the market in total, and the change will occur. How many
marginal buyers are required for a change to be profitable is idiosyncratic to each product. In some
markets (mainframe computers, for example) one large buyer may be sufficient. In other markets
(computer software, for example) it may take a larger number of buyers to generate sufficient
information to sellers. As indicated supra note 133 and accompanying text, it is highly likely that most
used car buyers do shop more than one dealership. This suggests that sellers are able to acquire
information from concerned, marginal buyers. Haggling over prices, changed sales techniques, new
terms, and the entry of new sellers into the market all provide evidence that sufficient numbers of
marginal buyers are active in the market to make a difference.
135. See Punj & Staelin, supra note 131, at 378.
136. See Beatty & Smith, supra note 131, at 84.
137. See Srinivasan & Ratchford, supra note 131, at 239.
138. See Beatty & Smith, supra note 131, at 84; see also Punj & Staelin, supra note 131, at 378
(showing cost negatively related to amount of search).
139. See Kiel & Clayton, supra note 99, at 237.
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in warranty terms. The latter point is demonstrated by the existence and variety
of warranty terms. Although some critics appear to regret the variety of
warranty terms available in the used car market,' 4° it is strong evidence of
sellers responding to buyers' preferences. Were they not doing so, one would
expect a market where all cars were sold without warranties. Warranties not
only provide protection against product failure, but also impose costs on both
the seller and the buyer. These costs consist of the price of the warranty, the
cost of ascertaining the existence of a defect, the cost of enforcing the
warranty, and the cost of providing a remedy in the event of breach by the
seller. Dealers would not include warranties and buyers would not pay for
them, given these costs, unless buyers attached a value to them exceeding their
costs. Thus the existence and variety of warranties in the market demonstrate
that there are buyers concerned about warranties and who therefore discipline
the market for all buyers, including those who are totally ignorant of warranty
terms. 
141
The above argument demonstrates that it is reasonable to believe that the
used car market generates appropriate warranty terms. It also demonstrates that
the market deals appropriately with the disclaimer of implied warranties. As
indicated above, some states require individual negotiation of warranty
disclaimers for such disclaimers to be effective.' These requirements appear
to be premised, at least in part, on the idea that unless buyers are aware of,
and individually acknowledge or participate in the disclaimer of implied
warranties, they will receive inappropriate terms. The preceding analysis
demonstrates, however, that this belief is false. So long as there are sufficient
numbers of buyers who are concerned about warranty terms and disclaimers,
they will discipline the market to provide the warranty terms and disclaimers
buyers prefer.'43 The fact that any one buyer fails to negotiate a disclaimer
is irrelevant to the question of whether she received optimal warranty terms.
140. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 252-53.
141. Whether the value of a warranty is due to its ability to provide a quality signal or due to the
comparative cost advantage of the warrantor to protect and insure against product defects does not
matter. In fact, empirical evidence for automobile warranties indicates the market values warranties for
both reasons. Boulding and Kirmani provide evidence in support of the comparative advantage reason.
See William Boulding & Amna Kirmani, A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling
Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?, 20 J. CONsUMER RES. 111, 119
(June 1993) (providing theoretical support and empirical evidence that warranty is valuable as "bonding"
signal between buyer and seller where strength and value of bond are related to cost advantage of
warrantor and quality of item sold by warrantor provides valuable signal of credibility, and concluding,
in part, that "a better warranty is an effective strategy for the high-credibility firm relative to the low-
credibility firm"). Douglas, et al. show that within a particular vehicle class warranties provide a quality
signal but that between classes the warranty serves a comparative cost function. See Evan J. Douglas
et al., Warranty, Quality and Price in the U.S. Automobile Market, 25 APPLIED ECON. 135 (1993).
142. See supra note 66.
143. For further analysis of warranty disclaimers, see Holdych & Ferrell, supra note 66.
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VI. WARRANTIES CREATED BY THE USED CAR MARKET
Since there appears to be no market failure at work in the sale of used cars,
the warranties that exist in that market and the sale of many cars without
warranties must have another explanation. Before undertaking a more particular
analysis of the warranties created through the used car market, it is appropriate
to analyze the conditions under which markets will generate warranties to
determine the circumstances under which they are likely to occur. The first
Section of this Part presents two general arguments for the existence of
warranties-the signaling and the comparative advantage theories-and
considers two important problems that arise due to the insurance feature of
warranties-moral hazard and adverse selection. The next Section sets forth the
differences in warranty terms and demonstrates why such differences exist in
accordance with the signaling and comparative advantage theories of warranties
and in order to avoid the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The
final Section of this Part provides a market based explanation of why
warranties do not arise in all transactions for used cars. Evidence is presented
to indicate that there are times and conditions under which providing warranties
is not an efficient response to buyer and seller needs.
A. Why Wrranties Are Provided: Signaling and Comparative Advantage
Warranties arise on at least one of two bases. The first is as a signal of
product quality. In the sale of most complex products, such as used cars, there
is asymmetrical information between the seller and the buyer about the
product's attributes. In many instances, it is excessively costly for the seller to
convey this information to the buyer. Without this information, however, the
buyer may be unwilling to purchase or purchase without a price discount that
the seller considers excessive. To avoid these buyer responses, the seller
includes with the product a legally enforceable commitment reassuring the
buyer about the product attributes and the product's quality. This commitment
acts as a signal to the buyer about the contents and quality of the complex
product.II The signal becomes part of the product being sold and is valuable
to the buyer because it eliminates the need to inspect the product.
A second basis for the existence of warranties is the comparative advantage
theory. 4' According to this theory, a seller and buyer will allocate between
themselves the costs of maximizing a product's usefulness by either making
144. A general discussion of the signaling theory of warranties together with the comparative
advantage theory discussed below can be found in ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
EcoNoMIcs 422-30 (1988). The role of warranties as special signals of quality in markets with
asymmetric information is discussed in ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECO-
NOMICS 604 (1995).
145. See Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 99, at 1310-12.
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investments to increase or maintain the product's usefulness or by insuring
against the product's failure. 46 How they allocate these costs depends on the
comparative prices and outcomes of the different expenditures. Thus if it is
cheaper for a seller to pay for the cost of product failure than the buyer, the
seller will guarantee this payment in the form of a warranty if the buyer is
willing to pay the price for this protection. A buyer will procure this protection
if the value of the protection is less than the price of the warranty. On the
other hand, the buyer may be able to pay the cost of some forms of product
failure more cheaply than the seller. 47 In that circumstance, the buyer would
not procure a warranty from the seller.
B. The Problems of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Whether a seller will provide and a buyer will purchase a warranty as well
as the character of a warranty depend not only on the producer's comparative
cost of service and value of the informational signal to the consumer but also
on two other factors: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection
exists when those persons most likely to encounter a risk procure insurance
against it. Thus if an insurance company insures against a particular disease,
those engaging in activity most likely to contract the disease are more likely to
procure the insurance. Rather than obtaining insureds from the general
population, the insurer is more likely to attract an unrepresentative pool of
insureds from those most likely to contract the disease. Moral hazard is the risk
that the event insured against will occur because the insured is indifferent
between not having the event occur and having the event occur and being paid
the amount of the insurance policy. When the insured is indifferent between
these two conditions, she will either fail to take reasonable precautions against
the event occurring or may engage in behavior that will cause the event to be
more likely to occur.
C. Market Operations: The Variability in Wrranty Terms
According to the 1978 FTC study and data collected by the authors of this
Article, express warranties offered by used car dealers vary significantly in
content. 48 Although criticized,' 49 this variation in part represents the
attempt of sellers in a competitive market to respond to consumer preferences.
It also represents the fact that there may be differences in the quality of the
cars being sold. 5 ' Three principal areas of variation in warranties are: (1)
146. See id. at 1308-13.
147. See id. at 1308.
148. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 253.
149. See id.
150. That such differences in warranty terms reflect differences in the quality of the vehicles being
sold is indicated in the FTC staff report, which states that dealers offer different warranty terms for
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duration, (2) parts coverage, and (3) allocation of the cost of repairs. Each area
is considered below in light of the signaling and comparative advantage
theories of warranties and the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
As will be discussed, the character of the terms in each of these areas is
consistent with a market that generates warranty terms based on the relative
costs and preferences of buyers and sellers.
1. Length of warranty coverage
One of the areas in which a variation in terms is found is that of warranty
duration. 5' Warranties run from 30 days or 1000 miles to 12 months or
12,000 miles, 52 with the latter generally being sold with more expensive or
newer model cars.' 53 That warranties vary with the age of a vehicle appears
consistent with the signaling theory of warranties. Newer cars generally would
have less wear and tear and be of higher quality, resulting in lower insurance
or warranty costs. Therefore, one would expect that the warranty "signal"
would be greater than that for a lower quality or older car.
Similarly, the warranty periods for used cars are significantly shorter than
those for new cars. 54 One would expect such a difference in signals between
a product that has been used, and thus is likely to have some parts that are
subject to failure, and an unused product free from wear and tear. A shorter
duration for used cars is also consistent with the comparative advantage theory
of warranties. A dealer may have a comparative advantage in protecting against
part failures manifested shortly after sale by inspecting the vehicle and making
required repairs prior to sale. At the time it inspects a vehicle in preparation
for sale, a dealer may be expected to have lower marginal costs than a buyer
for finding defects and making repairs. For part failures that occur substantially
after this time, the ability to take presale precautions becomes much more
costly. Thus one has to decide whether, for example, to replace a part that
might fail in six months or two years. At this point, the comparative advantage
in maintaining the vehicle shifts to the buyer. One of the principal factors
affecting whether a part will fail will be how the buyer drives and maintains
the vehicle. Here buyers are heterogeneous in their behavior, which means that
buyers who drive poorly are likely to suffer part failure earlier than those who
older and newer model cars. See id. at 254-57.
151. See id. at 253-55.
152. See id. at 254.
153. See id.; see also "Off-Lease" Cars, supra note 53 (reporting that Toyota off-lease cars sold
with 12 month, 12,000 mile warranty); Treece, supra note 53 (reporting that Mercedes-Benz used cars
with fewer than 100,000 miles have 12 month warranty).
154. New car basic warranties tend to vary in duration from 24 months or 24,000 miles to 48
months or 50,000, miles with warranties of 36 months or 36,000 miles being most common. Powertrain
warranties on the same vehicles tend to be longer with the longest being 120 months or 100,000 miles.
See Christopher P. Myer, Cyberspace Automotive Performance (visited Mar. 29, 1995) < http://www.-
eyberauto.com/info/sales/warranty.html >.
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drive better. Because dealers have no way of discriminating among buyers by
price based on their driving behavior, the price of the warranties will be
established on an average cost basis; in other words, all buyers will pay the
same price regardless of how they drive or maintain their vehicles. As a result,
good drivers will subsidize bad drivers if an extended warranty is sold. Shorter
duration warranties may also be sold to avoid adverse selection and moral
hazard. Longer warranties from dealers may attract buyers into their market
who drive their cars harder and maintain them less, contributing to product
failure.'55 Similarly, buyers who have longer warranties have an incentive to
drive a vehicle harder during the warranty period.
2. Component part coverage
Another portion of warranties that varies significantly is the coverage of
automobile components. 56 Some warranties cover only limited parts, such
as the "drivetrain" (the engine, transmission and drive axle) or "safety compo-
nents," those that must be satisfactory for the vehicle to pass a state safety
inspection.157 A warranty limited to the latter category of parts is explainable
on the comparative advantage theory. The dealer has possession of the vehicle
prior to sale and clearly has superior information about whether it is suitable
for passing inspection. Repairs to enable the vehicle to pass inspection would
generally be valuable to any purchaser and would not tend to depend on any
personal preferences. The nature of the work would not tend to depend on any
subsequent use by the buyer, therefore avoiding problems such as moral
hazard. The buyer may not have possession of the car for any significant time
prior to the inspection and may lack information about whether the vehicle will
pass inspection. Moreover, the value of the purchase will diminish significant-
ly, if not totally, if the vehicle fails inspection. The dealer's warranty functions
155. Providing extended, as well as regular or short term, warranties raises the cost to warrantors
for two reasons. One is that the longer term of coverage allows for the inclusion of more problems of
general use. The second is that more intensive users of the product will value the longer term more than
will less intensive users. This attractiveness to more intensive users gives rise to the problem of adverse
selection and raises the expected costs of honoring the extended warranty. Sellers can provide extended
warranty coverage by either average cost pricing for both a regular and an extended warranty or by
significantly raising the price of the extended warranty only. Using the first pricing scheme would have
less intensive users subsidize the more intensive users, exacerbating the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. The second approach may make the price of an extended warranty greater than the
value to the consumer. Hence an extended warranty will not be offered. The increased costs in providing
an extended warranty explains, in part, why the duration of warranty terms for used cars is generally
less than for new cars. See Zhiqi Chen & Thomas W. Ross, Why Are Extended Warranties So
Expensive?, 45 EcoN. LETTERS 253, 253 (1994).
156. See FTC Staff Report, supra note 32, at 255-56.
157. See id. Of the two warranties obtained by the authors, the one provided by CIM Insurance
Corporation is restricted exclusively to drivetrain parts, whereas the one furnished to Washington State
dealers by the Washington State Independent Automobile Dealers Association allows the dealer and
buyer to add parts in addition to those in the drivetrain.
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in the nature of a pre-use commitment that the vehicle can be used in a lawful
manner on the highways.
A warranty covering only drivetrain parts may also be explained by
comparative advantage. Although failure of other parts (e.g., brakes, starter,
fuel injectors or alternators) may affect an automobile's operability, buyers
may be more concerned about failure of a drivetrain part. Unlike defects in
parts such as brake pads, defects in the engine or transmission may be very
costly to discover. If a drivetrain part fails, repair is likely both to be more
costly and require a more specialized mechanic. Drivetrain part failures may
also inflict greater collateral or consequential costs on a buyer through the
vehicle being unavailable for a longer period of time. These factors mean that
the e ante cost of the failure of one of these covered parts is greater to the
buyer; therefore a warranty is more valuable. Moreover the existence of a
warranty creates greater incentives for a dealer to take precautions at the time
of vehicle inspection or preparation to assure the functioning of these parts.
Given the specialized nature of the dealer's business, taking these precautions
may be cheaper for the dealer to take er ante than for the buyer to take
thereafter. These parts can be distinguished in particular from those parts
which warranties tend to exclude-batteries, tires, trim, and glass."' The
latter are parts that are highly subject to buyer use so that any advantage in
maintenance clearly is with the buyer.
3. Repair cost allocation
The final warranty term is that pertaining to the cost of repair. Warranties
vary significantly, with the dealer bearing the full cost of repair for late model,
more expensive cars, the buyer paying a deductible per repair for some
vehicles,159 and the dealer and the buyer splitting repair costs for other
vehicles. 11 Although some may perceive an invidious motive in providing
for a deductible or splitting the costs of repair, 6' allocating part of the cost
of repair to the buyer is a form of co-insurance designed to protect against
adverse selection and moral hazard. If the buyer bears part of the cost of
repair, she is more likely to maintain the vehicle and drive it in a manner
which reduces the risk of part failure. Although it is common to think of
product failure as involving only conduct by the seller, buyer utilization of a
product also affects its performance and freedom from defects. 62 This fact
158. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 256 & 256 n.20.
159. The CIM warranty obtained by the authors provides for a $50 deductible per breakdown
requiring repair. The utilization of a deductible comports with the terms of contemporary service
contracts that can be purchased at the time of the purchase of a used car (contracts on file with authors).
160. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 257-58.
161. See Post, supra note 55, at 976.
162. See Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 99, at 1310-12.
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is recognized by warranty statutes that exclude from warranty coverage defects
resulting from product misuse and lack of maintenance. 63 Even if there is no
provable misuse, buyer use affects freedom from defects.
D. Third-Party Provision of Wrranties and Service Contracts
In addition to express warranties provided by a dealer, the used car market
provides warranties and service contracts through third-party providers."
Some service contracts provide only for repair or replacement of a defective
part which suffers a mechanical breakdown,"6 whereas others also cover
parts that fail through wear and tear."6 The coverage provided by the service
contracts may be quite extensive, covering vehicles with as many as 100,000
miles. 67 The number of miles for which the contract applies generally
depends on a vehicle's mileage at the time of sale. Although some contracts are
limited to drivetrain parts, the same companies offer contracts that are much
more extensive.'6 Some policies offer optional coverages based solely on the
purchaser's willingness to pay. 69 As indicated above, the contracts contain
deductibles, in one instance assessing a buyer a deductible of $50 per
component or part replaced. 70 In addition to providing for repair or replace-
ment of defective parts, the contracts also provide for a rental car for the
purchaser, towing of the car needing repair, and in some instances travel
expenses incurred as a result of a breakdown. 7'
Although some may criticize the availability of a service contract in place
of a warranty,'72 the existence of these third-party contracts clearly reflects
a market response to demand for insurance against product failure that in many
163. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b) (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 90. § 7N ' (3)(B) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F, § 662(2)(g) (West 1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-70 (West 1996); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1995); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-5.4-2(e) (1995).
164. As indicated previously, 29.8% of used cars sold by dealers in 1993 were sold with a service
contract. NADA Auto Executive, supra note 46, 46.
165. See, e.g., Associates Underwriting Limited Service Contract; 1995 Firemen's Fund VIP
Mechanical Breakdown Service Contract; PRco's Specimen Service Contract; Wynn's or Wynn's
Diamond Service Protection (contracts on file with authors).
166. See, e.g., Ford Extended Service Plan, Power Train Care Plan (wear and tear failures) (1994);
General Motors Repair Protection Plan (any part failure) (1994) (on file with authors).
167. See, e.g., Associates Underwriting Limited Service Contract (1995) (no limit on mileage);
General Motors Repair Protection Plan (1994) (100,000 miles).
168. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund VIP Mechanical breakdown Service Contract; Ford Extended
Service Plan, ITt Advantage Service Agreement Program; General Motors Value Guard Plan.
169. See, e.g., Heritage Warranty Corp. Contract; PRco's Specimen Service Contract; Wynn's
Diamond Protection.
170. See, e.g., Heritage Warranty Corp.
171. See, e.g., AFAS Service Contract; Associates Underwriting Limited Service Contract; Ford
Extended Service Plan; General Motor's Value Guard (1994); ITT Advantage Service Agreement
Program; PRco's Specimen Service Contract; Wynn's Diamond Protection.
172. See 1991 WASH. ATr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 46, at 10-11 (noting service contracts sold at
substantial markup in price).
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instances is not provided by sellers. As indicated above, the terms of such
contracts are largely similar to, and in some instances, more generous than
those in express warranties provided by dealers. 73 Moreover, the contract
terms are tailored to buyers' preferences and willingness to pay since buyers
can select the type of parts or components covered by the contracts. 74 Based
on the nature of the terms and the number of companies offering service con-
tracts, 75 there is no reason to believe that the contracts provide suboptimal
or uncompetitive terms. 1
76
E. When Wrranties Are Not Provided
Although a substantial percentage of used cars sold by dealers are sold with
warranties, many are not. Not only are some vehicles sold without an express
warranty, but they are also sold without an implied warranty of merchantability
and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Disclaiming the
implied warranty of merchantability appears inappropriate to some who do not
understand why a merchant does not commit that her product is at least fit for
its ordinary purposes, and who believe that the risk of product failure ought to
be spread among all purchasers of a product rather than be concentrated on one
unfortunate buyer. 7 7 The following materials will demonstrate that when the
expected value of a warranty to a buyer is small relative to the price of
warranty coverage, the buyer will not prefer or purchase a warranty.
Symmetrically, when the cost of providing a warranty to a potential provider
173. As noted above, some service contracts provide for towing, a rental car, and travel expenses
while a covered vehicle is being repaired. See supra text accompanying note 171.
174. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
175. The authors obtained service contract forms and materials from ten providers in the Puget
Sound area of the State of Washington (on file with authors).
176. A number of states regulate the provision of motor vehicle service contracts. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1095.0 to 1095.10 (West 1995); ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R20-6-408
(1995); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-90-501 to 512 (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-13-101 to 109 (West
1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 49-2803 to 2804 (West 1996); IOWA CODE § ANN. 3211.1 (West 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 65B.29 (West 1996); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 44-3520 to 3526 (1993); WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.96 (West 1996). The regulations vary in content. Some require inclusion in the contracts of
certain mandatory terms. See, e.g., ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R20-6-408.D.3.b. Among the
mandatory terms are those providing cancellation rights for a buyer. See, e.g., ARIZ. COMP. ADM. R.
& REGS. § R20-6-408 D.2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-507; IDAHO CODE § 49-2804 (10); WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.96.047. Others proscribe the use of certain terms or practices, including those considered
misleading. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-512; IOWA CODE ANN. § 3211.11. The measures
frequently provide that service contracts must contain a set of disclosures concerning the contract's terms
and information related to obtaining service under the contract. See, e.g., ARIZ. COMP. ADM. R. &
REGS. § R20-6-408.D.3.c; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-506; IDAHO CODE § 49-2804(1); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 3211.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.29 subd. 5; NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 44-3522(3)(4); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 48.96.040, .045. Finally, and most commonly, the statutes and regulations require the
contract provider to maintain a policy of reinsurance with a qualified insurance company to insure the
provider's obligations of performance under the contract, thereby protecting buyers from nonperforming
contract providers. See, e.g., AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1095.06.B.2; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-90-
505(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-13-102; IDAHO CODE § 49-2803(1)(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.29
subd. 2; NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 44-3522(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.96.020.
177. See 1991 WASH. Arr'Y GEN. REP., supra note 46, at 9 n.9.
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exceeds what a buyer will pay for coverage, no warranty will be offered. As
will be discussed, when a warranty claim is presented, disputes about the
source of a problem and the meaning of the warranty may give rise to
additional interpretation and enforcement costs that may make the providing of
warranty coverage inefficient. Finally, differential buyer use may contribute to
enforcement cost problems, cause some buyers to subsidize others, and result
in cars being sold with no warranties.
1. The value of a warranty
The main reasons dealers may sell used cars without a warranty, either
express or implied, are comparative advantage and differential buyer use. If it
is not cheaper for a buyer to pay a dealer to make investments to assure a
vehicle's continued use or to insure against the vehicle's subsequent break-
down, she will not purchase nor will the dealer offer a warranty. That it may
not be cheaper in many transactions for a buyer to pay a dealer for warranty
protection is demonstrated by evidence in the 1978 FTC study that some buyers
prefer purchasing at a discount to paying for a warranty. 78 That buyers may
be unwilling to pay for a warranty appears curious in light of the fact that
empirical data indicate that one-third of used car buyers from dealers report
defects in their cars,' 79 that perhaps a majority of defects materialize within
a month after purchase,"' ° that buyers report that they are concerned about
the mechanical condition when they purchase a used car,'' and that the self-
inspection that buyers use at the time of purchase generally is inadequate to
discover malfunctions in the complex machinery of an automobile. 182
Although these factors indicate that there may be a significant probability
that a used car will be defective when sold, they do not demonstrate that it is
cheaper for a dealer to protect or insure against a defect than a buyer. 183 To
determine that, one has to know in part what a warranty is worth to a buyer.
The 1978 FTC study reported that the mean cost of repairs for defects reported
178. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 252 n.9.
179. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
180. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 47.
181. See id. at 58.
182. See id. at 83-84.
183. A separate concern arises when safety problems are inadequately evaluated by the market, and
injuries are inflicted on third-parties. Even in this situation, mandatory warranty legislation is not the
best way to correct for market failure. A more effective means to deal with these third-party concerns
is through vehicle equipment safety statutes. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. & TRAF. CODE § 24002. (West
1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.37 (West 1996). Under the negligence per se doctrine, a person who
causes injury to a third person as a result of operating a vehicle in violation of such a statute would be
liable in negligence for damages. See Brannan v. Nevada Rock & Sand Co., 823 P.2d 291 (Nev. 1992);
Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Effect of Violation of Safety Equipment Statute As Establishing
Negligence in Automobile Accident Litigation, 38 A.L.R.3d 530 (1971). The operator, of course, can
insure against such liability with liability insurance. The use of mandatory warranties in this case would
increase the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
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by used car buyers was $109.84 If, as indicated, one-third of buyers experi-
ence defects in the cars they purchase, then the probability of encountering a
$109 defect is 33%. Therefore, at the time of purchase, the expected cost of
the defect is $37, or the mean cost of repair, multiplied by 33 %, the likelihood
of needing repair. Absent any enforcement or other costs, the maximum value
of the warranty to the buyer is $37. If the warranty provides for splitting the
costs of repairs equally between the dealer and the buyer, it is worth $18.50.
If a warranty covered this defect, the buyer might have to return the vehicle
to the dealer to have the vehicle repaired if the warranty provided for an
exclusive repair or replacement remedy. " Returning the vehicle might
impose significant enforcement costs compared to taking the vehicle to a local
mechanic. This cost might be particularly high if the car is purchased at some
distance from the buyer's residence, say in another city or state.'
86
2. Dispute resolution and enforcement costs
In addition to the enforcement costs in returning a vehicle to a dealer, the
buyer and dealer would incur costs determining whether the warranty covered
the problem. This issue might not be straightforward with a used vehicle. If the
warranty requires that the automobile or the part is defect free at the time of
sale and that the warranty extends for 30 days, one would have to determine
whether the problem was attributable to a defect that existed at the time of sale
or whether it was unrelated to a defect or arose thereafter. If it occurred
because of buyer abuse, the problem probably would not be covered by the
warranty.
Making these determinations is costly but necessary to avoid the problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Nevertheless, these enforcement costs
affect the value of the warranty. If the joint cost to the seller and the buyer of
determining whether the warranty covers the problem is hypothetically, on
average, $20, the value of the warranty is reduced from $37 to $17.187 If the
184. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 59.
185. See U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(b) (1989) (stating if remedy is agreed to be exclusive, it is sole
remedy). A used car dealer who offered a "full" Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act warranty might be
precluded from imposing the cost of returning a vehicle for return on a buyer unless the dealer
established in an administrative proceeding that requiring the buyer to pay such an expense was
reasonable. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (West 1982). Since full warranties are infrequently offered in the
sale of new goods, it is highly unlikely that they are offered in the sale of used cars.
186. If a consumer believes that she will not reside in close proximity to the warrantor who
provides the service, the cost of returning the vehicle for service will increase significantly. The amount
the buyer would be willing to pay consequently will fall. When the transaction cost of returning the
vehicle to the service location exceeds the value of the service itself, even ignoring the other costs of
adjudicating the dispute and possible co-payments, the amount a buyer would be willing to pay for the
warranty will approach zero and it will be in both parties' best interests to disclaim even implied
warranty coverage.
187. Even though a portion of the resolution cost is nominally borne by the seller, the incidence
of the cost at the margin may be borne by the buyer.
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cost to the buyer of returning the vehicle to the dealer to determine whether
there is a covered defect 18 and perhaps to have the vehicle repaired 19 is
$10, the value of the warranty to the buyer is $7. If the buyer bears half the
$37 in repair costs, the warranty is valueless. Even if the warranty is worth $7,
it may be cheaper for the buyer to purchase at a discount and self-insure
against vehicle defects. 1'"
3. Dealer costs in performing warranty obligations
In determining the value of a warranty, one must also consider the cost to
a dealer of maintaining a repair facility, having a relationship with a facility to
perform repairs, or maintaining personnel to process warranty claims and work
by third-party mechanics. If the joint costs to a dealer and buyer of enforcing
a warranty exceed the costs to a buyer of purchasing a car without a warranty
and taking it to an independent mechanic for repairs, rational dealers and
buyers will take the less costly course of action. Ordinarily a warranty would
include, either expressly or implicitly under the Uniform Commercial Code,
a remedy either providing for repair of a covered part or paying the buyer the
costs of repairs effectuated by a third-party mechanic. Used car dealers are in
the business of selling automobiles, and there is no reason to believe that it is
cheaper for them to maintain repair facilities, particularly for vehicles that may
only be warranted for 30 days, than it is for a buyer to take the vehicle to an
existing mechanic whose business indicates that she has a comparative
advantage in repairing cars. Some dealers may employ mechanics to conduct
presale inspections and repairs, but the employment of such mechanics does not
mean that the dealership has a comparative advantage in maintaining a repair
shop to cover the range of repairs that might be required under a warranty.
Even if the remedy under a warranty simply reimburses a buyer for the costs
of making repairs with her own mechanic, a dealer must employ someone not
only to determine whether there is a covered defect as discussed above but also
188. The cost of returning the vehicle for this determination would be the marginal cost in excess
of the cost of simply taking the vehicle to a mechanic for the needed repair. It is assumed that cost
would exist in any event if a part proves defective.
189. Instead of the dealer providing a remedy of repair, the warranty might simply require the
warrantor to pay the buyer a sum equal to the amount of repairs.
190. That other guarantees or mandatory disclosure might not be that beneficial to buyers is
demonstrated by two recent studies. In the first, the authors found that a "buy back" program by
Chrysler Corporation, under which the manufacturer promised to purchase from one of its new car
buyers a vehicle that was bought within the previous thirty days, was worth $218 to purchasers of full-
size cars and $138 to purchasers of intermediate cars but only $2 to buyers of compacts. See Charles W.
Smithson & Christopher R. Thomas, Measuring the Cost to Consumers of Product Defects: The Value
of "Lemon Insurance," 31 J.L. & ECON. 485, 502 (1988). Similarly, Pratt and Hoffer found no
statistical difference in the repair costs faced by purchasers of used pickup trucks in states having and
not having mandatory defect disclosure laws. The authors concluded that the mix of used cars in the
states having mandatory disclosure laws could not be considered of higher quality than those in the states
not having such laws. See Pratt & Hoffer, The Case of Used Vehicles, supra note 9, at 316.
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to verify the extent and costs of the necessary repairs and perhaps to determine
the adequacy of the work to protect against future warranty claims. These
expenses must also be incurred to avoid significant fraud and error costs.
4. Differential buyer use
Even if a dealer's cost of repair is not excessive, a buyer may prefer self-
repair. This preference will exist if a buyer can inspect and repair a vehicle
more cheaply than a dealer. 9' Even if she cannot perform this work herself,
a buyer may have a mechanic whose work she values more highly than a
dealer's, making it preferable to procure the vehicle at a discounted price
without a warranty.
Error costs in enforcing warranties combined with differential buyer use
also affect a warranty's value. As mentioned above, determining whether a
defect is covered by a warranty may be more costly with a used, as opposed
to a new, product. Consequently, there are likely to be higher error costs in
deciding whether a problem is covered by a warranty. If randomly distributed,
these error costs will not affect the value of a warranty. The times for which
a dealer incorrectly determines that a defect is not covered will equal those in
which she erroneously decides that one is covered. If, however, in attempting
to maintain lower costs, dealers systematically err in finding defects that should
be covered are not, the value of a warranty will be lowered. Conversely,
differential buyer use may affect the error cost. Buyers who drive their cars
harder or do not maintain them are more likely to suffer product failure.' 92
With a warranty, they have an incentive to file an illegitimate claim. Given the
difficulty in segregating legitimate from bogus claims, some number of these
claims are likely to be granted. If a significant number of bogus claims are
granted, the cost of warranties will increase with no value to legitimate
warranty claimants.
In addition to error costs in deciding whether defects are covered by a
warranty, differential buyer use will result in buyers who are more careful in
using their vehicles subsidizing less careful or higher intensity automobile
users. How a buyer maintains or uses a vehicle is likely to contribute to the
occurrence of part failure. 93 Lack of maintenance and abusive driving are
obvious behaviors contributing to such breakdowns. Perhaps less obviously,
simply driving an automobile more frequently or for more extended periods of
time may cause earlier or more frequent part failure."9 Since the administra-
tive costs of price discriminating among buyers based on how they drive or
191. See Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 99, at 1308-09 (observing that consumer
frequently can provide some repair services more cheaply than manufacturer).
192. See id. at 1312.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1316.
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maintain their vehicles is excessive, dealers must sell warranties on an average
cost basis. As a result, the buyer who maintains her car and drives it more
carefully subsidizes the buyer who uses her vehicle more intensively or with
lower maintenance, since the former buyer is less likely to incur part failure
and presents a lower cost of warranty coverage to the dealer. To avoid paying
this subsidy, the careful, low intensity user is likely to prefer not purchasing
a warranty through a dealer.
5. The meaning of merchantability
Elimination of the cross-subsidy is an issue affecting the disclaimer of
implied warranties as well as the failure to include an express warranty in a
transaction. In addition, for an implied warranty of merchantability to provide
the intended benefits, it is necessary that the term "merchantability" have a
relatively certain, understandable, and enforceable meaning. When a term's
meaning is not clear, disputes arise concerning the scope of the term's
application requiring costly resolution procedures. The vagueness of the
merchantability concept 95 may be one reason merchants often disclaim that
warranty. 196
The term is especially vague when applied to a used car, particularly one
with a substantial number of miles. Is a car with 40,000 miles "fit for its
ordinary purposes," for example, if the brake pads are 1/8 inch thick? If the
vehicle has 61,000 miles and has its original timing belt?"9 Rather than incur
the costs of resolving these issues and discount the value of a warranty based
on the probability that a defect will not be covered, a rational buyer may prefer
to purchase a used vehicle at a reduced price without a warranty.
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY WARRANTY COVERAGE
From the foregoing, there appears to be no market failure that would
require adoption of mandatory warranty legislation, and the warranty terms that
the market has produced appear rationally explainable in terms of sellers' and
buyers' preferences. The question, then, is what effect mandatory warranty
195. See T. J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980); Fear
Ranches, Inc. v. H. C. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F.
YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTs 245-47 (4th ed. 1995) (recounting that warranty of
merchantability stated in U.C.C. § 2-314 is, according to one lawyer, "a very broad, subjective standard
that juries can interpret to mean that buyer is entitled to relief if buyer is dissatisfied in virtually any way
with the product").
196. See Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 99, at 1344 (finding that juries subject
to error in deciding consumers and uses for which product is designed and charge warrantor with use
not preferred by dominant class of consumers).
197. It is common to replace a timing belt at 60,000 miles, at least on vehicles driven long
distances at low speeds. See 1989 Toyota Camry Repair Manual MA-2 (1988).
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legislation is likely to have on the used car market and the behavior of dealers
and buyers.
The first effect of the legislation is to increase the cost of selling used cars.
A warranty imposes costs on a dealer including initial preparation expenses to
make a vehicle conform to a warranty, administrative costs to determine
whether there has been a breach of warranty, and the expense of providing a
remedy. These costs are increased under mandatory warranty legislation that
compels a dealer to give a buyer a refund if the dealer fails to repair a vehicle
within a specified number of attempts.
198
To the extent that dealers cannot shift the incidence of these costs to
buyers, some dealers will go out of business. Although the exiting of the
market by marginal dealers may be applauded by some, it will reduce
consumer choice and to some extent make the market less competitive.
To the extent dealers can shift the additional costs to buyers, 199 prices for
used cars will rise. Unless buyers value mandatory warranties sufficiently
highly, the quantity of used cars sold by dealers will decrease.' Since the
price differential between new and used cars will diminish, some potential used
car buyers will upgrade their purchases to new cars. Other buyers will choose
to retain their existing cars longer, spending more on maintenance. Finally,
some will choose to purchase used cars from non-merchant sellers.2"'
198. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b) (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481-
6(a) (Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NV4(3)(A)(ii) (West 1989); N.J. ANN. STAT.
§ 56:8-76; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(c) (West 1996). Depending on the jurisdiction, the
refund may include not only the purchase price but also registration fees, insurance, and taxes paid by
the buyer upon purchase of the vehicle.
199. Although in the short run the relative elasticities of the supply and demand curves may
preclude dealers from shifting some or all of the costs of providing warranties to buyers, in the long run
the market would adjust, and the full cost would be borne by buyers. Otherwise, the rate of return on
used car dealerships would fall below that of other businesses and result in capital being shifted to those
businesses. For the market impacts of cost shifting based on elasticity conditions, see Pindyck &
Rubinfeld, supra note 144, at 36. The argument for a perfectly (or almost perfectly elastic) supply curve
is based on the assumption of capital mobility and the free flow of resources. This most likely holds in
the market for used automobiles due to its competitive nature, lack of entry requirements, and low start
up costs.
200. With a price increase, the quantity demanded at the new price would be lower than at the prior
lower price. If buyers attached value to a warranty, the quantity demanded at each relevant price would
be higher than without a warranty. If buyers valued a warranty sufficiently highly, the quantity
demanded at the new price might be as high or higher than at the original non-warranty price.
201. The option of purchasing from non-merchant sellers could present a number of problems.
Buyers from non-merchants may find it more difficult and expensive to procure warranty coverage.
Non-merchant sellers are probably unlikely to have a comparative advantage vis-a-vis buyers to assure
that vehicles possesses warranted attributes. Moreover, non-merchant sellers may not be able to offer
warranties or service contracts sold by third parties, as the sellers of these warranties and contracts may
make them available only through merchant dealers. In addition, when "after market" warranties or
service contracts are available from third-parties, individuals who purchase from non-merchant buyers
will encounter the additional cost of searching for these sellers and negotiating the sale. These additional
transaction costs may be sufficiently high to discourage some potential buyers from securing this type
of coverage, even though absent the additional cost it would have been efficient for them to do so.
Buyers who want an express warranty will shop the merchant part of the market. Buyers who do not
value this coverage will be more inclined to search the non-merchant sector. Allowing buyers to choose
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For those who choose to purchase used cars from non-merchant sellers,
which may represent the largest segment of those who will not purchase a used
car from a dealer, it is not clear that the enforced warranty provisions will
improve the consumers' positions. Indeed, it is possible, if not probable, that
their condition could be made worse. Non-commercial sellers are not subject
to market discipline, such as loss of goodwill, and therefore may be likely to
sell inferior cars.2' 2 For those who choose to drive older cars suffering from
greater wear and tear, and possessing less safety equipment, the safety level of
used cars is likely to be reduced. Thus, those customers pushed out of the
dealer market may suffer increased harm due to mandatory warranties.
Some of these effects have been observed in markets where states have
required mandatory disclosure of defects or passage of safety inspections in the
sale of used vehicles.2 3 Michael Pratt and George Hoffer examined the
consequences of a Wisconsin law requiring seller disclosure of used vehicle
defects and an Iowa law requiring a used vehicle sold by a dealer to pass a
safety inspection. They found no significant differences for repair costs or
vehicle quality between purchasers in those two states and buyers in a state,
Minnesota, not imposing such requirements. They observed, however, a
significant decline (from 60% to 34%) in the share of the market for used cars
for licensed car dealerships and a corresponding shift to sales through private
transactions (not covered by either law). They concluded that one impact of the
disclosure and inspection laws would be "a relative shift of sales to the private
whether or not to purchase from a segment of the market that offers warranty or service contracts
provides a form of market segmentation that promotes efficiency, in the same way shoppers for stereo
equipment can shop for preassembled systems or for component parts. See ANDREu MAS-COLELL ET
AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 453-59 (1995), for a discussion of the efficiency of the separating
equilibrium. This problem with non-merchant sales will occur when the market cannot segment based
on consumer preferences and seller costs. In addition, by mandating warranties in the merchant segment,
the option of merchant sales without warranties is eliminated. Those buyers who would have preferred
merchant purchases but not a warranty may now move to the non-merchant segment. Those merchants
who cannot cost-effectively sell with a warranty will leave the market. Both of these responses will
reduce the efficiency of the used car market.
202. Cf. Pratt & Hoffer, State Used Motor Vehicle Disclosure Laws, supra note 9. But see FTC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 32, at 121 (finding that purchasers from private sellers reported having fewer
defects and received more defect information than buyers from dealers).
203. Safety inspection and disclosure laws are not exactly the same as mandatory warranty laws,
but they are parallel in certain important respects, and therefore reasonable inferences about the impacts
of mandatory warranty laws can be drawn from those associated with inspection and disclosure statutes.
A study by Pratt and Hoffer, Pratt & Hoffer, State Used Motor Vehicle Disclosure Laws, supra note 9,
revealed that inspection and disclosure laws did not, contrary to expectations, result in higher quality
used cars being sold, as reflected by subsequent repair costs compared to used vehicles in a control state
which had no such laws. The inference is that the market, absent such legislative mandates, provides
appropriate incentives for vehicle quality in the sale of used cars. Theoretical consistency and parallelism
make this "experiment" with inspection and disclosure laws worth consideration for legislation
mandating warranties in the sale of used cars. A conclusion is that the market captures all relevant and
valuable information without mandatory disclosure rules. This Article argues that the same results as
ensued from the adoption of inspection and disclosure laws will occur if mandatory warranty rules are
imposed, and consumers will be no better, and possibly worse, off.
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market. It would then follow that an individual would have a greater likelihood
of purchasing a lemon. "204
Importantly, the higher price for used cars will generate an equity effect.
Used car buyers have significantly lower incomes than new car buyers.2"5
One of the important functions of a market for secondhand assets such as used
cars is to provide an avenue for lower income households to acquire assets,
such as durable goods, which are expensive when purchased new. As Tibor
Scitovsky notes: "Secondhand markets for consumer durables therefore
perform the socially valuable service of mitigating the inequalities of income
distribution .. ."20 To the extent, then, that mandatory warranties will
increase the price of used cars, the burden will fall disproportionately on lower
income households. The "socially valuable service of mitigating the inequalities
of income" will be lessened. For lower income buyers who cannot absorb this
price increase, the options are twofold: go without or shop in the private used
car market. Choosing the former, of course, makes the opportunity cost of
transportation for the poor increase significantly. Opting for the latter will not
only frustrate the intent of the mandatory law, but, as argued below, will
probably reduce the safety of cars purchased by these buyers.
To the extent that buyers do not prefer mandatory warranties, dealers will
purchase and sell more vehicles that are outside the mileage range of the
particularly more extensive warranties0 7 or less expensive vehicles for which
a warranty is not required.2" They will tend to purchase and resell older,
higher mileage automobiles which will probably tend to have greater defects
and be less safe. Similarly, if the mileage on a vehicle is at the dividing point
between less and more extensive warranties, a dealer has an incentive to place
additional miles on the vehicle to avoid the costs of the more extensive
warranty. Such behavior would simply be a waste of resources.
Contrary to what might be expected, mandatory warranty legislation might
increase the cost of repairs in cars sold by dealers. Those buyers who formerly
accepted used cars without warranty protection because they could repair their
vehicles more cost effectively than the dealer will have an incentive to let the
dealer take care of warranty problems. Buyers who are in possession of and
probably have more knowledge about nonconformities in cars than dealers will
have reduced incentives to repair such vehicles themselves and more costly
resources are more likely to be allocated to repairing vehicle defects.
204. Pratt & Hoffer, The Case of Used Vehicles, supra note 11, at 318.
205. See Friedman, supra note 111.
206. See Scitovsky, supra note 1, at 37.
207. Post found that one New York dealer discontinued purchasing vehicles with fewer than 36,000
miles since he did not want to be obligated under the mandatory 60 day warranty. See Post, supra note
55, at 998 n.138.
208. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(c)(1) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F
§ 662(3)(1) (West 1995) (mandatory warranty not required for vehicle whose price is less than $3000).
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The incentive for buyers to take less care with their vehicle is exacerbated
by the requirement in some legislation that the dealer pay the entire cost of
repair.' ° Warranties requiring the buyer to pay a percentage of the repair
costs are forbidden. As indicated above, such payment is a form of co-
insurance designed to provide an incentive for a buyer to protect against the
risk of vehicle failure. Without such payment, buyers are likely to provide less
maintenance and drive their vehicles in a manner which increases the risk of
part failure.
The response of mandatory warranty legislation to the problem of increased
moral hazard is to exclude, or allow the dealer to exclude, from mandatory
warranty coverage defects that arise from buyer negligence, lack of mainte-
nance, or abuse.210 Although these exclusions tend to minimize the problem
of moral hazard, they do so in a less effective manner than co-payment
requirements. The principal reason is that a dealer would have to establish that
a defect resulted from abuse or lack of maintenance. There are likely to be
error costs in making such a determination and disagreements as to what
constitutes abuse or proper maintenance. As a result, a mandatory warranty is
likely to be found to cover some defects that are the result of abuse or lack of
maintenance. Moreover, even if there is no provable misuse or lack of
maintenance, buyer use of a product in terms of how well it is used can affect
its freedom from defects. Buyers who care for or drive their vehicles more
poorly than others are likely to experience more defects and receive warranty
coverage.
As indicated previously, mandatory warranty coverage is likely to result in
a cross-subsidy from one set of buyers to another. When all buyers must
purchase warranty protection, those who do not want it or could provide the
service themselves must pay part of the cost of providing the protection, giving
a subsidy to those who value the coverage more highly and would have
purchased it anyway. This subsidy generally flows from those who do not
suffer as great a loss from the failure of a defective car, i.e., those who are
comparatively poorer, who do not use a car as intensively, or who use it more
carefully, to those who are more affluent and those who use a car with more
intensity or less care.
Many of the efficiency and equity effects of mandatory warranties could be
eliminated if the legislation provided that a buyer could contract out of or
waive the mandatory warranty. Some of the statutes either have no provision
209. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 42-220 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-
2(a) (Michie 1995). But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 7N'A(2)(A)(i) (West 1989) (allowing
$100 deductible for first set of repairs under mandatory warranty); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-70 (West
1996) (allowing $50 deductible for each repair).
210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
§ 7N'A(3)(B); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325F § 662(2)(g); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-70; N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(b)(4); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2(e) (Michie 1995).
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regarding or precluding waivers.21' Others permit a waiver but only as to
parts which the dealer specifies in writing are defective,2 12 or as to vehicles
with more than a specified number of miles.213 Clearly the former is the
more onerous in preventing the parties from entering into a contract that
maximizes the value of the transaction to themselves. But the latter legislation
is not significantly better. A dealer and buyer may want to purchase and sell
a used car, regardless of mileage and without a warranty even if there are no
known defects. The latter legislation does not allow a disclaimer of the
mandatory warranty in that situation, limiting a waiver to specified defective
parts or high mileage vehicles for which it is either assumed or mandated214
that the dealer will receive a lower price. A buyer who simply wants to
purchase a car at a reduced price without a warranty is precluded from doing
so. Preventing such a buyer from making such a waiver is inefficient since it
precludes the buyer from selecting the optimal product attribute mix for herself
and is inconsistent with the philosophy of consumer sovereignty.
One area in which some assert that mandatory warranty legislation provides
superior treatment to consumers to that available under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is that of remedies.2"5 Under the Uniform Commercial Code a
warrantor is liable, on breach of warranty, for one of several remedies. If a
buyer discovers a breach prior to accepting a vehicle216 and gives the seller
proper notice,2"7 she may reject the car and force the seller to take it back.
A buyer who has accepted a vehicle and discovers a defect may not reject but
may have one of two other remedies. The buyer can revoke her acceptance of
the vehicle and force the seller to retake the automobile if the defect substan-
tially impairs the value of the vehicle to the buyer, and she accepted it on the
reasonable but erroneous assumption that the defect would be cured, or she
accepted the car without discovering the defect either because of the difficulty
of discovery or the seller's assurances.2 ' If the defect is not of sufficient
211. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 7N/ (no provision on waivability); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(d)(1) (waiver void as contrary to public policy); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2
(no provision on waivability).
212. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-221(d); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-3; MINN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 325F § 662(4)(1).
213. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-73 (over 60,000 miles).
214. See id. (waiver permissible only if buyer and seller negotiate price adjustment).
215. See Post, supra note 55, at 975-91.
216. Acceptance does not preclude such use by the buyer as necessary to discover any defects after
delivery by the seller. See Capitol Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 535
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1968) (driving vehicle from dealership not an acceptance precluding rejection); Lloyd v. Classic Motor
Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (buyer's limited use of vehicle for one-half month
after delivery did not preclude rejection).
217. U.C.C. § 2-602 (1989).
218. U.C.C. § 2-608. The revoking buyer is also entitled to damages based on the failure of the
seller to deliver a vehicle that conformed to the warranty. These damages would be based on either the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time when the buyer discovered the
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magnitude to allow her to revoke her acceptance or she does not choose that
remedy, she is entitled to damages based on the difference in value between the
vehicle as received and the value of the vehicle as warranted together with any
consequential loss.219
The Code allows parties to a contract to modify or limit the remedies for
breach of warranty to specified or limited remedies.2' It is common for
contracts for the sale of goods to provide that a buyer's remedy is restricted to
repair or replacement of a product that does not conform to a warranty, and
that the buyer cannot reject, revoke, or recover money damages. If a car
proves defective, for example, a buyer must return the vehicle to the dealer for
repair or replacement and cannot revoke her acceptance and obtain the price
back, unless she can establish that the limited or exclusive remedy of repair
"failed of its essential purpose" 21 and that the defect substantially impaired
the value of the vehicle to her. Establishing failure of essential purpose is
indeterminate, based on whether the seller repaired the vehicle to conform to
the warranty within an appropriate or reasonable period of time. 222 Thus a
buyer who has returned a vehicle for repair four or five times may not be able
to establish that the limited repair remedy has failed of its essential purpose.
Even if she can prove that the remedy has failed of its essential purpose, a
buyer may not be able to revoke and obtain a refund if she cannot prove that
the defect or breach of warranty substantially impaired the value of the vehicle
to her.223
Mandatory warranty legislation has dealt with these perceived deficiencies
by specifying the number of attempts at repair after which the dealer must
provide the buyer with a refund, and by specifying the nature of the defect
which will permit the buyer to seek a refund.224 With respect to the latter
issue, legislation in two jurisdictions eliminated the Code requirement that the
defect constituting the breach of warranty must substantially impair the value
of the vehicle to the buyer.2' Instead, it provides for a refund if a dealer
fails to repair a defect as defined by the statute within a specified period of
time. Under the statutes, a defect is any defect or malfunction that impairs a
breach, or the difference between the contract price and the price of a substitute or "cover" vehicle. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 713.
219. See U.C.C. § 2-714. Typically, the former amount would equal the cost to repair the defect
to have the vehicle conform to the warranty. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2(a) (3d ed. 1988).
220. U.C.C. § 2-719.
221. Id.
222. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1990); Kelynack v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 394 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc.,
569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981).
223. See U.C.C. § 2-608.
224. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-6(b) (Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 90, § 7N A(3)(A) (West 1989); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20 § 198-b(c) (West 1996).
225. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NIA(2)(A)(i).
Yale Law & Policy Review
vehicle's use or safety.226 The statutes do not require that a malfunction
significantly impair the use of a vehicle. The only attempt in the legislation to
preclude a refund for trivial defects is the exclusion of defects in appear-
ance.
227
Precluding a buyer from obtaining a refund for trivial defects is important
because without such an exception, compelling a seller to retake a car and
provide a refund may not be an efficient remedy. George Priest has demon-
strated that where the loss from a defect is less to the buyer than to the market,
returning the goods to the seller is generally not the cheaper remedy.22' The
remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code consist of paying a buyer
damages based on the loss in value of the defective goods which she
retains229 or allowing the buyer to return the goods for a refund. ° If the
goods are less valuable to the buyer than to the market and the seller's costs
of retrieving the goods and selling them on the market are lower than the
buyer's cost of either repair or resale, the more efficient remedy is for the
seller to retake the goods and give the buyer a refund.23' For a consumer
purchaser of a used car, the costs of reselling a car are probably higher than
they are for a merchant dealer.232 Moreover, the costs of returning a vehicle
to a dealer probably are not very high. The question then is whether the car is
more valuable to the market than to the buyer. If the defect is substantial to the
buyer, the vehicle is more likely to be valuable to the market, since it is likely
that someone in the market values the vehicle more highly than the buyer.
Moreover, a used car is not like a specially manufactured good which is more
likely to have higher value to the purchaser than anyone else in the market.
Therefore, having the seller retake the vehicle and provide a refund is the
appropriate remedy.
If the defect is insignificant or trivial to the buyer, the car may still be
more valuable to the market than to the buyer, but the transaction costs of
retaking and reselling the vehicle probably exceed the loss to the buyer.
Moreover, a buyer allowed to obtain a refund for a trivial defect could use the
defect to speculate on a falling market, or to avoid a transaction which she
226. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90, § 7N'A(2)(A)(i).
227. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-2(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N (2)(A)(i).
228. See George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REv. 960, 965 (1978).
229. See U.C.C. § 2-714 (1989).
230. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602, 608, 711. A buyer who rejects a nonconforming tender or revokes
acceptance of goods is also entitled to damages based either on the difference between the contract price
and the market price, see U.C.C. §§ 2 711(1), 713(1), or the contract price and the price of obtaining
substitute goods, see U.C.C. § 2-712.
231. See Priest, supra note 228, at 965.
232. The principal costs of resale are preparing a vehicle for sale and advertising the car to the
market, for both of which the dealer has existing facilities that the buyer probably does not.
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subsequently discovers is less suitable than originally believed.233 Permitting
a buyer to obtain a refund in either circumstance increases the e& ante cost of
the transaction by giving the buyer an unbargained for satisfaction clause. This
satisfaction clause is one that can be exercised after the buyer has had
substantial utilization of a car, thereby increasing the cost to the seller of
permitting the buyer to return the car for a refund.234
To avoid incurring the costs of retaking a car, reselling it, and providing
a refund, a dealer will spend an amount on repairs and e ante vehicle
preparation equal to the expected costs of these activities. 235 If the defect for
which the buyer may obtain a refund is trivial in value to her, the seller may
spend an amount on avoiding the costs of providing a refund that is greater
than the value of the harm to the buyer. The dealer may do so either by
spending excessive resources in preparing the vehicle prior to sale or in repairs
after a defect is discovered.236
Mandatory warranty legislation in the referenced jurisdictions do an
imperfect job of precluding refunds for trivial defects. Trivial malfunctions
may impair the use of a vehicle and thereby entitle a buyer to a refund.
Although it is still true that a defective vehicle may be more valuable to the
market than to the buyer, and that a dealer can probably resell the vehicle more
cheaply than a consumer, the legislation ought to be interpreted or amended to
avoid the above problems by precluding the buyer from obtaining a refund
where the defect is trivial.2 37 The difficulty with such an amendment or
interpretation is in defining a standard for the defect that allows the buyer to
return a vehicle in such a manner so as to avoid high dispute resolution
costs.
23 8
Mandatory warranty legislation has also dealt with the issue of when a
dealer must provide a refund after having attempted and failed to repair a
vehicle. A buyer may obtain a refund if a seller fails to correct a defect within
233. See Priest, supra note 228, at 967.
234. Hawaii and Massachusetts, but not New York, attempt to deal with this problem by making
the buyer responsible for the reasonable cost of using the car prior to returning it to the dealer. See
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-6(a) (Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N'A(3)(A)(ii)
(West 1989). But cf. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b(c)(1) (McKinney 1996).
235. See Priest, supra note 228, at 974.
236. A rational dealer, at least when the situation involves post breach repairs, may simply bargain
with the buyer for the cost of the trivial breach in exchange for the latter's waiving the right to a refund.
The buyer, having had possession of the vehicle and perhaps valuing it substantially less, may attempt
to extract a monopoly price. In any event, the bargaining between the buyer and dealer will involve a
bilateral monopoly, and the buyer's right to a refund may lead to substantial bargaining costs,
237. Mandatory warranty legislation in New York deals with this issue by retaining the requirement
in U.C.C. § 2-608(1) that a defect must substantially impair the value of the automobile to the buyer
before the latter can obtain a refund. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b(c)(1).
238. An additional solution would be to allow the parties to contract for a remedy should the seller
be unable to repair the defect in the statutorily provided time. Rational parties would adopt a cost-
effective remedy. They would not choose an inefficient remedy that shifted losses to the buyer, since
the latter would simply discount for the inefficient remedy in the purchase price.
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a specified time.239 In three jurisdictions, a dealer must correct a defect
within a reasonable period of time as specified by a certain number of attempts
at repair or after a vehicle has been out of service for a designated period of
time.2 ' Another statute simply provides that the buyer may obtain a refund
if the seller fails to repair a defect within a specified number of repair attempts
or if the car is out of service for a certain number of days.24' All four
statutes provide greater determinacy than U.C.C. § 2-719, which provides that
a buyer is no longer bound to an exclusive or limited repair remedy and may
seek a refund if the repair remedy fails of its essential purpose. To the extent
that the statutes establish a fixed time period rather than a presumptive time,
they reduce dispute resolution costs.
By making the time periods more determinate and relatively short, the
statutes provide incentives for dealers to spend more resources earlier in the
repair process to avoid having to take back a car. These incentives reduce the
proclivity of some dealers to underinvest in repairs until expiration of the
warranty period. They also reduce consequential losses to buyers caused by
extended loss of their vehicles either as the result of defects or during repair.
However these limitations may also lead to excessive investments in repair.
As alluded to above, a seller faced with the remedy of providing a buyer with
a refund has an incentive to overinvest in repairing a vehicle to avoid incurring
the costs of retaking and reselling.242 Mandatory warranty legislation may
place some limit on the amount of repair by limiting the number of opportuni-
ties for repair before a buyer can obtain a refund, but it does not limit the
amount spent on repair on each occasion on which a vehicle is returned. A
dealer still has an incentive to spend an amount on repairs up to the total cost
that it would incur if a buyer returned a vehicle. This amount may well exceed
the cost of the defect to a buyer. Thus, the legislation may cause a dealer to
spend an inefficient level of resources on a repair at a quicker rate. It may be
more efficient to return a vehicle on several occasions both to attempt to
ascertain the nature of the defect and then to correct it, making earlier repair
less efficient than later repair. A more efficient approach might be to allow
parties to contract for a liquidated amount of damages if the vehicle is not
239. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-6(a)-(b); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N'A-
(3)(A)(ii); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b(c)(l).
240. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481J-6(a)-(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-71 (West 1996); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b(c)(2). The presumption that a dealer has had a reasonable time to cure defects
after three attempts at repair may have greater effect than one might assume. In Jandreau v. LaVigne,
566 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (App. Div. 1991). the court indicated, albeit apparently in dictum, that once
a claimant proved that a dealer had three attempts to repair a defect, the burden shifted to the dealer to
prove either that the defect did not substantially impair the value of the vehicle or that the defect was
the result of unreasonable use or neglect. The court failed to mention the ability of the dealer to prove
that a further period of time to repair the defect was reasonable.
241. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NIA(3)(A)(ii).
242. See Priest, supra note 228, at 974.
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repaired within the statutory period, and either allow the parties to contract for
further repairs or simply allow the liquidated amount to compensate the
buyer.243 Permitting such arrangements would place a limit on excessive
investments in repair while providing an appropriate incentive for a dealer to
make the correct investments in repair.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the law should require express warranties in the
sale of used cars is a significant one. It is important for society to avoid
inefficient levels of defects in used cars, and to discourage inappropriate
allocation of risks for such defects. Likewise, it is crucial that society not adopt
measures that will impose excessive harm in seeking to accomplish these
objectives. Efforts to avoid excessive defects and inappropriate risk allocation
must assess whether there exists market failure that causes these two problems.
As this Article has demonstrated, there is little reason to believe such market
failure exists in the used car market.
The principal argument for imposing warranties in the sale of used cars is
that buyers are relatively uninformed about the condition of used vehicles and
underestimate the value of warranty protection. There is little doubt that not all
buyers of used cars are completely informed about the probability of vehicle
defects, repair costs, consequential damages, or the value of warranty
protection. But, as discussed herein, these issues are not determinative of how
a market operates or whether it will produce efficient terms. Rather, as
demonstrated, the used car market will provide appropriate warranty terms to
the extent there are sufficient buyers who are adequately informed and are
concerned about the existence and content of warranties. That such buyers exist
and that the market provides warranties they prefer is forcefully demonstrated,
in part, by the existence of warranty and service contracts sold by dealers and
third party providers in the absence of statutory mandates.
Although well-intentioned, mandatory warranty legislation is likely to
produce excessively harmful effects and counter-productive outcomes. Rather
than improving the market position of used car buyers, their position will
worsen. The price of used vehicles will increase, reducing the number of
vehicles purchased and pricing low-income buyers out of the market. For those
who do purchase, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection will
increase the cost of repairs and service claims and shift the production of these
services to less cost-effective providers. The higher price will encourage
owners of used cars to hold their cars longer, leading either to increased
maintenance costs or reduced safety, less fuel efficiency, and more environ-
243. Cf. id. at 981.
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mental problems. Finally, to avoid the consequences of express warranties,
some buyers will purchase from non-merchant sellers of used vehicles who are
not governed by mandatory warranty laws. As a result, cars will continue to
be sold without warranty coverage. As non-merchant sellers probably have no
comparative advantage in preparing vehicles for sale, the safety and quality of
used cars moving through this segment of the market may decline. Moreover,
non-merchant sellers are more likely to be idiosyncratic market participants,
suggesting an increase in market problems from sellers who are less subject to
the discipline of competitive market forces.
The extent to which legislatures will continue to enact mandatory used car
warranty laws is difficult to predict. Despite the failure of mandatory warranty
legislation in the State of Washington, 2" Hawaii and New Jersey have
recently enacted such laws.245 In contrast, evidence about the operation of
markets, such as that presented in this Article, and the existence of warranties
and service contracts voluntarily contracted for in the purchase of used vehicles
should demonstrate that the used car market functions sufficiently well in
providing appropriate and efficient voluntary warranties. Nevertheless,
perceptions of market failure (due to lack of information or bargaining power)
continue to exist, and many of the unintended adverse consequences of
mandatory warranty legislation are difficult to observe or are counter-intuitive.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this Article, there is no compelling public
policy purpose to be served or market failure to be remedied by mandatory
used car warranty laws. Indeed, the "cure" is worse than the "cold."
244. See supra note 34.
245. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 481J; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-67.
Vol. 15:1, 1996
